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THE UTILIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONAL CUES BY 
ONE- AND TWO-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN 
by
Rhianon Allen 
Adviser: Professor Joseph Glick
The relationships between three models for describing pragmatic 
response to utterances were surveyed and the application of these 
models to young children's response patterns evaluated. Of particular 
interest was how children might discriminate action-directive and 
information-testing usage of language.
In order to empirically test the validity of these models, sixteen 
one- and two-year-old children were visited in their homes. Each child 
participated in two video recorded play sessions with an experimenter, 
during which he or she was asked complex What-questions that could take 
either informational or action responses. Gestural accompaniments and 
preceding discourse were systematically varied in Experiment I. Each 
child was also given the opportunity to respond to routine directive 
and testing speech forms. In Experiment II, the experimenter asked the 
What-questions while the child was looking at irrelevant toys and again 
while the child was looking at relevant pictures.
In Experiment I, children responded appropriately to the routine 
speech forms, but treated complex What-questions as ambiguous. Of 
special interest, children often responded with answers which combined
iv
informational and directive interpretations.
Some aspects of context also affected responses to complex What- 
questions. The presence of a gesture prompted responses which tend 
towards nonverbal expression (orienting, acting). The toy activity in 
which a child was engaged affected the rate of action responding, but 
did not affect other aspects of response. The pragmatic function of 
the discourse preceding target questions had no effect on children's 
responses.
Two-year-olds gave more responses that combined or conflated 
action and informing, and gave more simultaneous response combinations, 
than did one-year-olds. Two-year-olds, but not one-year-olds, 
responded to the presence of a gesture by doubling their base rate of 
responses which contain both action and informing. The linguistic 
sophistication of the child appeared to be less strongly related to 
response than was chronological age.
These results indicate an early sensitivity to wording, and an 
increasing ability to integrate linguistic and nonlinguistic sources of 
information. Overall, the results support a model in which children 
are sensitive to both pragmatic structures and communicative cues.
v
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I. INTRODUCTION
In face-to-face discourse we often respond to conversational 
events in ways which indicate that we have gone beyond, or have fallen 
short of, the linguistic information inherent in the surface form of 
a particular conversational utterance. One of the ways in which 
literal form may be exceeded or bypassed is in the derivation of 
pragmatic function. It has been a main argument of pragmatics and 
speech act theory that utterances are used to do things in ways which 
very often cannot be directly reduced to the information contained in 
their vocabulary and grammar. For example, "Can you pass the pepper?" 
is literally an inquiry about one’s capability. However, its prag­
matic function is conventional in nature; it is commonly used and 
perceived as request to pass the pepper.
At the very least, by school age, a child would be wise to 
discern when a question such as "D’ya wanna try it?" should be taken 
as a sincere question, a directive, or a dare. A critical issue in 
the development of communicative skill, consequently, is how the child 
comes to understand what is meant when the utterance can have more 
than one pragmatic function. While it is acknowledged that at school 
age, most children's pragmatic knowledge is still limited in compari­
son to that of adults (Ackerman-, 1978; Grimm, note 1), it has also been 
argued that children attempt to use their communicative systems in 
more than one way even from the very earliest stages of productive 
communication skill (Bates, 1976; Halliday, 1973, 1975). The specific
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concern here will be with how very young children respond to questions 
which can take either of two very common pragmatic functions. It is 
these two functions— direction and testing— which underlie much of the 
child's early conversational environment. It is a valid question, 
therefore, to ask whether or not the child distinguishes between these 
two functions in speech directed to him or her, and how he or she 
distinguishes them.
There exist two main models of pragmatics from which one may draw 
hypotheses about pragmatic development, and one peripheral model which 
has received little in the way of systematic attention. These may be 
termed the structural, strategic, and cue utilization models; it is to 
these three models, and their unique theoretical concerns and predic­
tions, that the remainder of this chapter is devoted.
The structural models
The primary motivation of structural models is the demonstration 
and classification of intentionality as displayed in speech. While 
structural models are primarily models of competence, they can be used 
to generate performance models which lend themselves to empirical veri­
fication.
In the course of structural analyses of ordinary language use, 
four classes of speech acts have been delineated. Although termino­
logy varies somewhat, these four classes can be called the explicit, 
direct, conventional, and implied speech acts. Because the processing 
models differ somewhat for each of these speech act types, a brief 
description and explanation of these classes follows.
Historically, the explcit performative was the first to be
3
investigated. Austin (19750, in his 1955 Willian James Lectures, 
described situations in which a speaker accomplishes an act in a 
rather explicit manner. In such explicit performatives or speech 
acts, structural linguistic cues (wording, verb choice) carry critical 
information on the function of the utterance. For example, a speaker 
may say "I request that you pass me the salt". While certain condi­
tions must still be fulfilled in order for the act to be successful 
and appropriate, the wording of such acts indexes the function of the 
utterance in an explicit manner.
The second class of speech acts, the direct act, has received 
little attention. These are cases in which wording generally serves 
as a direct, but not explicit, index of intent. A prime example is 
the imperative form, which is commonly used to convey a directive 
intent without explicitly stating the intent in the utterance itself 
(compare "Come here" with "I request that you come here"). Direct 
forms are generally utterances which do not include the explicit 
intention marker (e.g., "I order you to...", "I ask you..."). These 
abbreviated forms are much more common in everyday language use than 
explicit forms, which tend to be restricted to formal and ritualistic 
situations.
The third class of speech acts, examined most extensively in the 
philosophical literature by Searle (1975), can be called indirect- 
conventional speech acts. This class is comprised of utterances for 
which a decontexted structural analysis of wording would lead an 
investigator or responder to Function A, when in fact most native 
speaker-hearers would select Function A*. In these utterances, the
4
function is made neither explicit nor direct, yet a function is readily 
intended and conveyed, although in an indirect manner. A popular 
example is the utterance "Can you pass the salt?", when the utterance 
functions not as an inquiry, but as a request. Searle’s accomplishment 
in the investigation of such speech acts was what amounted to a lin­
guistic and philosophical 'proof' that these acts can express their 
functions indirectly by virtue of a structured coordination between 
linguistic meaning and the contextual conditions in which indirect 
meanings are commonly conveyed. Such indirect speech acts are con­
ventional because they tend to be expressed in wordings commonly used 
to convey given indirects meanings (e.g., "Can you...?"). Searle's 
argument has been used as a blueprint for the construction of psycholo­
gical processing models (e.g., Carrell, 1981; Clark & Lucy, 1975) in 
which a responder derives a literal meaning for an indirect speech act 
prior to transforming this meaning into a related, intended meaning.
In such a model, indirect meanings can be computed by a hearer if they 
are expressed in conventional form (or a variant) with a structurally 
supportive setting.
The fourth class of speech acts rests on the assumption that, in 
addition to functional appropriateness conditions, all utterances must 
fulfill a set of conditions of face-to-face conversations, termed 
'conversational postulates' (Grice, 1975). Implied-nonconventional 
speech acts, afe the term itself implies, are utterances which are not 
explicit, direct, or conventional, yet for which functional assignments 
and derivations can be made within contexts of use. A typical example 
is "It's ten o'clock"— a simple informing response in the case of a
5
preceding request for information, but a directively-shaded warning to 
a child who is dawdling over a bedtime snack. It has been argued that, 
as with conventional indirectives, a hearer first derives a literal 
meaning and checks this functional meaning against the conditions of 
use. The original meaning is transformed through a logical process to 
obtain a derived function.
No matter which class of speech acts is under consideration, all 
structural models share four basic tenets: (1) the functions that
speech serves can be classified into a small number of basic catego­
ries of speech acts, (2) the wording, or form and content, of an 
utterance indexes a literal meaning of that utterance which can be 
associated with a primary pragmatic force, (3) the context of an 
utterance can be characterized as fulfilling, or not fulfilling, a 
relatively small set of conditions which determine the appropriateness 
of this apparent primary force; these are generally termed ’felicity 
conditions'; and (4) respondants can, in perceiving a mismatch between 
primary force and the conditions of an utterance, engage in a process 
of inductive and deductive reasoning which eventuates in a secondary 
or derived force.
The first principle is not about to be challenged here. Speech 
does serve functions, whether or not active conversants consciously 
classify the acts in which they engage. The only point to be made 
here is that the two functions that will be investigated, testing 
and directing, belong to two different and discriminable categories of 
speech acts and should be maximally distinct to any native speaker- 
hearer.
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There is little discussion in pragmatics of how the second tenet, 
the derivation of primary pragmatic meaning from wording, can be 
realized in psychological processes. That is, there is little under­
standing how a function can be assigned on the basis of syntactic and 
semantic information. While it is assumed that speakers can convey 
and hearers derive a functional speech act using wording as evidence, 
our notions of how this may be accomplished are somewhat vague. It 
seems unfortunate that a theory predicated on a native speaker-hearer’s 
ability to utilize wording has not clarified the parameters and pro­
cesses associated with this capacity. The capacity is taken largely 
as a matter of faith, although there is some verification of its 
existence in adults (Clark & Lucy, 1975) and school children (Carrell, 
1981). As will be seen later, strategic models have directly 
challenged the utilization of wording in the derivation of pragmatic 
meaning. One of the issues addressed in the current research is 
whether young children who are still struggling towards an understand­
ing of grammar give any evidence of using wording patterns for the 
derivation of a primary pragmatic force.
With regard to the third principle, the nature of the felicity 
conditions is best conveyed by outlining the conditions which define 
and confirm the two acts of directing and testing. The specific 
formulations are taken from Searle (1969, p. 66). A speech act is 
directive if and only if: (1) its propositional content is a potential
act to be performed by the hearer, (2) the hearer is capable of 
executing that act, (3) the speaker believes that (2) is correct, (4) 
it is not obvious to speaker and hearer that the hearer would perform
7
the act without being directed to do so, (5) the speaker wants the 
hearer to perform the act, (6) the speaker has the authority to direct 
the hearer, and (7) the speaking of the utterance is an attempt to get 
the hearer to perform the act. The defining conditions of a test are 
different. An utterance is a test if and only if: (1) the speaker 
wants to know if the hearer possesses information, (2) it is not 
obvious to speaker and hearer that the hearer would volunteer that 
information without being asked, and (3) the speaking of the utterance 
is an attempt to elicit the information from the hearer. These lists 
are not exhaustive, but do impart the general flavour of felicity 
conditions. They are not discrete, concrete events. Instead, they 
involve relatively abstract notions such as intentionality, capability, 
and authority. Structural models are the only models which emphasize 
the role of formal contextual features in this manner. This feature 
has a corollary that contextual conditions that are not formal and 
abstract have no place in a model of pragmatic competence. This point 
will become important in constrasting structural theories with other 
available models.
The final tenet rests on the assertion that a competent speaker- 
hearer is able to convey and derive speech acts through utterance forms 
which are not direct and explicit. None of the three pragmatic models 
discussed here challenges this assertion. It is the hallmark of 
structural theory, however, that this is accomplished in a specifiable, 
step-wise manner: (1) a primary force is conveyed or derived, using 
the wording of an utterance, (2) this force is matched against the 
felicity conditions associated with that force, (3) if the primary
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force and the conditions match or confirm each other, the primary force 
is considered accomplished, but (4) if they do not match, the exact 
nature of the disagreement or mismatch can be used to retrieve or 
construct the intended meaning. The entire enterprise rests on the 
structured interrelationship of wording, felicity conditions, and 
human logic.
To reiterate a point, most theorists holding to a standard 
structural model view themselves as engaged in linguistic-philosophical 
inquiry. Their concern is the elucidation of the structure of speech 
acts and the characterization of an internally coherent model of 
language competency. As with structural models of grammar and cogni­
tion, one can frequently observe a distinct aversion to the notion that 
actual performance may not follow the dictates of coherency, logic, and 
abstract principles. In pursuit of elegance, the strategic and cue 
utilization models argue, structural theory has failed to recognize the 
dynamic and richly textured nature of people attempting to communicate.
The structural model makes rather extensive demands in terms of 
linguistic and cognitive skills, both of which can be assumed to be in 
the process of development in young children. It remains somewhat 
unclear, then, whether a structural model is at all appropriate for 
children whose syntactic (Chomsky, 1969) and logical (Piaget, 1966) 
development is far from complete.
The strategic models
Strategic models argue that the application of a structural system 
to very young children is inappropriate on two counts. First, toddlers 
and preschoolers have too fragile a grasp of grammar for one to expect
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them to utilize wording for the derivation of primary force. Secondly, 
the young child does not possess the inductive and deductive logical 
skills which would allow the derivation of a secondary or implied force, 
even if a primary interpretation could be derived.
In place of a structural system, the dominant strategic model 
(Shatz, 1978b) postulates that the child adapts sensori-motor heuris­
tics developed during infancy as strategies for responding to speech. 
Since sensori-motor processes are heavily invested in direct action 
on objects, the deployment of such strategies results in the child 
responding to most speech as if it had a directive intent. Development 
away from this simple strategic system is viewed as gradual, and is not 
complete even by the fourth year. Over the course of the third year, 
the child learns through direct experience that direct action 
strategies do not always lead to acceptable responses and must be 
inhibited in many circumstances. The strategic model points to a set 
of contextual cues which may serve to inhibit the tendency to act in 
response to utterances. These are called stop-action markers.
Preceding discourse and the absence of toys upon which to act are two 
cited examples of acquired stop-action markers. In the absence of 
such stop-action markers, children are still expected to revert to an 
action strategy for responding to speech.
In short, the main point of strategic models is that there is 
often little in the objective or logical conditions of a communication 
which directly predicts a response. Instead, the representative capa­
city of the responding organism is the prime determinant of response.
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A strategic model is adept at explaining and predicting many 
aspects of actual performance in communicative settings. For example, 
it clarifies why children may have no difficulty in responding to 
mother's indirect wordings of directive forces (Shatz, 1978a).
However, there are reasons for dissatisfaction with its scope. Shatz 
(1979) has voiced the concern that children may indeed use wording, 
although not in the way suggested by structural theory. Allen and 
Shatz (in press) have noted that the occurrence of action responses to 
some questions varies widely amongst 16 - to 18-month-olds. As best, 
a simple strategic theory may not capture the complexity of the one- 
and two-year-old communicative response system. Neither a structural 
nor a strategic model seem completely adequate to the description of 
young responders.
The cue utilization model
This model is based on the consideration that the majority of 
everyday utterances are ambiguous in some regard, but that a speaker 
will generally provide, and a hearer utilize, a variety of situational 
and linguistic cues which indicate how an utterance should be inter­
preted. The factors that influence response to language are not con­
fined to simple psychological heuristics or to the structured linguistic 
and felicity conditions outlined by structural theory. While these 
latter may exert some influence on some responses, there are a number of 
factors outside the purview of structural and strategic theory which 
influence how the child or adult will respond to an utterance.
Historically, the model can be traced to Austin's (1975) stance 
on 'primitive devices' in direct speech acts. Austin described the
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following as some of the factors which can affect interpretation: 
syntactic mood, tone of voice, grammatical particles, gestural accom­
paniments, and circumstances of utterance. It can readily been seen 
that these factors or devices are more concrete than the wording- 
function relation and felicity conditions associated with the 
structuralist model, functioning more like cues in a response cuing 
paradigm (Orne, 1981). These devices can be termed ’pro-force'markers.
The contrast with the structural model is best exemplifed by the 
differing stances on the role of wording in interpretation. Differing 
sharply from the structuralist model, the cuing model makes a distinc­
tion between routine (occasionally, 'idiomatic') and nonroutine forms. 
Routine forms are syntactic constructions that are sociolinguistically 
so closely tied to a particular function that meaning has become 
'lexicalized' (Cole, 1974; Sadock, 1972; c.f. Panther, 1981). That is, 
in encountering such a form, respondants have an immediate perception 
of the intended meaning, and do not engage in the elaborate inferences 
invoked by the structuralist system. An adult participant may choose 
to conduct a structural analysis, but this is not generally the case 
for natural interaction, and is probably beyond the capacity of a small 
child under any circumstance. Lexicalization would be learned from 
concentrated exposure to form-function redundancies (Shatz, 1979), and 
evidence for the lexicalization effects of parental language routines 
has been presented by Allen and Shatz (in press).
Nonroutine, less common forms are those constructions whose 
wording does not directly carry a functional import. These forms are 
considered to be more ambiguous than routine forms, eliciting the
12
derivation of function through sensitivity to contextual cues.
Responses to nonroutine forms, then, are expected to vary according to 
various aspects of context.
Now, what contexts? Allen and Shatz (in press) argue that 
gestural accompaniments of questions increase some kinds of nonverbally- 
expressed response, but do not affect vocal responses. There is 
evidence from other sources (e.g., Murphy & Messer, 1977) that children 
will orient to gestures, but that the gestural response system is not 
complete by late infancy. It would seem, then, that gesture is one 
aspect of context that affects response (however fortuitously in a 
structuralist’s eye), but that its effect may be limited to nonverbal 
components of replies and that its role may change over age.
The toy and activity with which a question is associated may 
affect response, but the data are not entirely consistent here. Bruner 
and co-workers (Ninio & Bruner, 1978; Ratner & Bruner, 1978) have 
argued that some activities are developed by parents into scripted 
routines into which a child gradually learns to insert appropriate 
responses. Certain types of activities (e.g., book reading), then, 
should be used as cues for the production of functionally tailored 
responses. However, children do not always discriminate between 
picture and action toy activities in their responses (Allen & Shatz, 
in press). More research will be necessary in order to clarify the 
relationship between activity context and responses to questions.
There are certain affinites between the strategic and cue utilize" 
tion models. Both are concerned with a characterization of actual 
performance in face-to-face interaction. Both argue that the linguistic
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and cognitive demands of a structural model exceed the capacities of 
language-leamers. In lieu of sophisticated analytic processes, 
children in interaction are considered to possess alternative means 
for governing their participation. The models concur that interaction 
systems must incorporate contextual cues to pragmatic force, and that 
these cues are learned in the context of parent-child discourse. The 
disagreement, therefore, is not on a philosophical or paradigmatic 
level.
The disagreement is over what the response system jjLis. The 
strategic model formulates a system wherein the primary response 
impulse is towards action and development is the accumulation of stop- 
action markers. The cuing model proposes a system in which pro-force 
markers are gradually acquired, transformed, and integrated. In the 
strategic model, the child is constantly acting in response to 
language, unless he or she is confronted with evidence that this is 
inappropriate. In the cue utilization model, a conversational 
participant is perceived as constantly scanning for indicators of how 
a message should be taken.
Three models for the perception of pragmatic force
We have just surveyed three models for how a member of a speech 
community might be able to respond to conversation in ways which are 
not reducible to his or her grammatical understanding. The first 
model is structural in nature, with an emphasis on a linguistic/ 
cognitive analysis of the utterance and certain aspects of its 
issuance. The second argues for the existence of a response strategy, 
with a gradual accretion of contextual and linguistic markers which
14
inhibit the deployment of this heuristic. The final model emphasizes 
early sensitivity to discrete pro-force markers, with continuing 
development and integration of functional cues.
These three models have been framed as competing theories of 
communication. But given that development occurs, it is possible that 
one model may be appropriate for communicative interaction at one age, 
while a different model may best characterize interaction at a further 
point in development. The question addressed here, then, is not which 
theory is the best pragmatic theory, but which model is appropriate for 
children in the age range of one to two years. Theoretical qualifica­
tions about the appropriateness of a structural model have been voiced 
above, and indeed some evidence has been presented against this model 
in the age range of one to three years (Shatz, 1978b). But similarly, 
the main proponent of a strategic model has remarked first of all that 
the action strategy may be partially outgrown by this period (Shatz, 
1978b) or may not be applicable at all (Shatz, 1979). The problem 
with the cue utilization model is that although we may know more than 
Austin did when he wrote his treatise on pragmatics, we may still 
safely say that we have no theory about which objective conversational 
cues are linked to which pattern of assigned meaning.
In the following experiments, three sources of possible pragmatic 
variation are manipulated in an attempt to evaluate the applica­
bility of the three response models to one-and two-year-old children. 
These are wording of stimulus utterance, context of stimulus utterance, 
and age/linguistic skill of responder.
For the manipulation of wording, children are presented with
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three syntactic frames which are very common in parental speech 
(imperatives, "Can you...?", "What's this?") and one which is less 
common (complex What-questions). Each of the three models makes 
unique predictions of the dominant response to each utterance type.
In addition, the complex What-questions will be presented to 
children while a set of candidate contextual cues are varied. The 
contextual conditions are preceding discourse (directive, informative, 
neutral), gesture (points, no gesture) and toy activity (play with 
appropriate toys, play with question-irrelevant toys, looking at 
pictures).
The children who respond to these utterances are drawn from two 
different age groups: one and two years. These children are expected 
to manifest a range of expressive language skill. Thus, we may be 
able to determine the type of trajectory of any developmental changes 
in response pattern, and whether such changes are more closely related 
to age or linguistic skill.
Because some model predictions require knowledge of who the 
responders are, and what their pragmatic experience has been, there 
will be an attempt to characterize some aspects of these children's 
pragmatic environment (parental question usage) and their general 
communicative skill or linguistic status. For this reason, the 
presentation of specific hypotheses is postponed to Chapter III.
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II. METHOD
This investigation consists of three separate methodologies— one 
experiment which manipulated minor contextual accompaniments and 
wording variations of messages within a naturalistic format, a second 
which varied the gross circumstances of target question presentation, 
and nonexperimental settings which afforded the collection of informa­
tion on child language skill and parent-child communication.
Experiment I
Experiment I investigated the role of minor contextual cues in 
children's responses to What-questions presented in a semi-structured 
play session.
Subjects. Subjects were 16 children aged 17 to 28 months. The 
one-year-old group consisted of four boys and four girls of ages 17 to 
21 months; the two-year-old group contained four boys and four girls 
aged 24-28 months. All children were from middle class families 
contacted on an individual basis. Two of the children in the younger 
group were first-borns, as were five of the children in the older group. 
The remaining children had between one and four older siblings at home. 
All families used English as the primary language in the home, although 
six children in the sample had had substantial exposure to a second 
language. The only language development criterion for entry in the 
study was that the child have at least five English words in the
17
productive lexicon— words which the mother could identify. Families 
were not reimbursed for participation.
Materials (toy sets). Three toy sets were used for the experimen­
tal sessions— a doll, house, and barn set. The doll set consisted of 
a rag doll with extra clothing. The clothing was intermediate in size 
between that normally required for the doll and that appropriate for a 
small child (i.e., baby clothes). These items were a hat, slippers, 
socks, and mittens. A toy truck large enough to seat a small child 
was included for some children; a small foam ball, a small tea set, 
and a small set of realistic plastic fruit were included for all 
children.
The house was a standard Fisher-Price doll house. The set of 
furniture and dolls which normally comes with the set, however, was 
reduced in number to avoid distraction. A small foam ball and a set 
of minature plastic fruit were included in the set.
The barn was a Fisher-Price barn and animal set. The set includes 
a tractor trailer, doll people, and fencing material. The set of 
people and the peripheral materials (e.g., horse harness) was reduced, 
again to avoid distraction. A small foam ball, a wooden tree, a small 
woolen bird, and minature plastic fruit were added to the set to expand 
the actions available to the child.
These toy sets were assembled so that children would have the 
opportunity to give appropriate action responses to all target questions 
asked during play. For example, embedding the question "What do you 
wear on your head?" in the doll set allows the child to respond by
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trying to put on the hat from the set. At the same time, a sufficient 
variety of toys was included to ensure that a child had several dis­
tinctively different actions available at any given time. Order of 
toy set presentation was determined randomly for each child.
Materials (target questions). Target questions were What- 
questions with two to three basic semantic object-units. They were 
identified from pilot work as being used by mothers as direct test 
questions. However, they can also imply in a nonconventional manner 
that an action be performed. For example, "What do you do with a 
truck?" is directly used to elicit the verbal response "Drive" or 
"Ride", but children can interpret it as a request to play with the 
toy truck in an appropriate manner.
Table 1 presents the target questions used in both Experiment I 
and Experiment II. The question frames are presented with the lexical 
items which were substituted into them. Each child heard only two 
wordings of each frame, with the particular lexical items determined 
on a random basis for each child. In this way, a particular child 
heard two questions from each frame several times but he did not 
necessarily hear the same wordings as any other child. Questions were 
distributed evenly among the relevant toy sets and randomized, within 
certain sequencing constraits, for order of presentation. Constraints 
were that no more than two identical contextual conditions be allowed 
to follow each other, and that no more than two identical phrasings be 
allowed to follow each other. This constraint was formulated to avoid 
the clustering of cues in time. As an example, it was considered
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Table 1
Target questions for Experiments I & II
/ hands
1. What 1 do you T wear on your/its 4 head V ?
1 does a dolly f I feet J
2. What X  lives \  in a J house I* ?
V, goes J ^ barn I
{does baby "jdoes a cat r do/eat ?
do you J
{ f banana"\do you "I do with a < ball h ? does dolly J car J
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necessary to avoid the succession of three or four directive settings 
in case the child construct a generalized expectancy for directive 
discourse.
Materials (nontarget events). With each toy set, each child was 
presented once with the following nontarget stimuli.
-"What's that?" accompained by point at object 
-imperative form of a target question (e.g., "Put 
the bird in the tree")
-"Can you" form of a target question (e.g., "Can 
you eat the apple?")
On approximately half the occasions, the imperatives and "Can you” 
questions were accompained by a pointing gesture directed at one of 
the referents of the utterance.
All nontarget stimuli were randomized with target questions for 
placement within a toy set. Each child was asked to respond to 16 
target wordings and three nontarget stimuli in each 15 minute toy set 
activity.
The "What's this?" stimuli determine how children respond to 
another direct test question. The last two events are a direct and a 
conventional directive, and hence should be responded to by action if 
children are attending to linguistic cues.
Experimental design. The two contextual conditions, preceding 
discourse and gesture, were factorially manipulated, yielding a split 
plot design. The general design is schematized in Table 2. Since 
each question was asked under all condition, eight responses per
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Table 2








Directive Set Informational Set Neutral Set
Gesture NoGest* Gesture NoGest* Gesture NoGest*
*NoGest = questions were not accompanied by gestures.
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condition type (i.e., eight target wordings) or 48 target data points 
in total were obtained for each child. Each nontarget stimulus, not 
represented in Table 2, was offered a total of three times for each 
child.
Discourse set is determined by a two-utterance sequence which 
precedes each target question. Both directive and informational sets 
exhibited some topic coherency with the target questions in that they 
concerned related members of the toy set without mentioning the actual 
toy indicated by the question itself. Directive discourse sets con­
sisted of imperative frames aimed at involving child in action with 
the toys available. Info.rmational sets were active declarative 
utterances aimed at involving the child in orienting to or talking 
about, but not touching, the toys. Examples of a target question 
preceded by its directive and informational sets follow:
Informational All these clothes are for the dolly.
She wears shoes and mittens.
What does a dolly wear on her head?
Directive Here, put the mittens on dolly.
Now put on the socks.
What does a dolly wear on her head? 
The third discourse set was not a series, but the experimenter asked 
the target question after a pause of approximately one minute since 
the last utterance. This was termed the ’neutral1 setting, although 
it should be cautioned that it is not so much a neutral as a 'child- 
determined ' setting.
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In order to study the effects of gestural accompaniments of 
questions, target questions were presented under two gestural condi­
tions— gestured and no gesture. In the gestured condition, questions 
were asked while the experimenter pointed at the object whose name is 
the answer to the question (frames 1, 2, & 3) or the object of the 
question (frames 3 & 4). For an example of how preceding discourse 
and gesture combine, a child presented with a gestured directive 
question will hear;
Make the dolly sit.
Give her the apple*
What do you do with a banana? (E points to banana)
In the no gesture condition, questions were asked without accompanying 
gestures.
General procedure. Prior to the experiment, all children were 
visited in their homes by the experimenter. Mothers of subjects were 
informed that their children were to participate in a study of communi­
cative development, and were given an estimate of how many visits the 
study should entail (2—3) and how long the average visit should last 
(1-1% hours). They were asked to complete a language assessment scale, 
and a short mother-child play session was audio recorded (see below),
Up to two weeks later, the experimenter returned with video 
equipment and toys. The equipment was set up and left until the child 
felt at ease. As soon as the child began to ignore the equipment, the 
mother was asked to play or conduct some other normal activity (e.g., 
snack time, looking at books) of her own selection. After a five-
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minute taping of this session, she was asked to sit back or alongside 
of the child while the experimenter played with and talked to the 
child. She was requested not to interrupt unless she felt the session 
should be terminated.
The experimenter then played and conversed as naturally as 
possible with the child, embedding the target sequences and nontarget 
events in filler conversation. The target sequences were timed so 
that they fell evenly among already instigated action activities, 
looking and talking activities, and pauses, regardless of the discourse 
set type. However, such timing was not rigidly controlled, as not all 
children evenly distributed their activities among these three basic 
possibilities. After all target questions for a toy set had been 
asked, the toys were replaced with the next set if the child was 
considered ready. A toy set was removed if the child ignored five 
consecutive target items, and tried again at a later point in time.
The day's procedure was completed at the mother's suggestion or when 
the child appeared to be uncooperative and tired. Most children 
completed two toy sets in one half-hour sitting. A second day of 
testing was necessary for a majority of children. The same procedure 
was used on the second day, with a brief parent-child taping (when 
time allowed) followed by the experimental procedure. The overall 
structure of the Experiment I interactional setting was designed to 
mimic a normal adult-child play session as closely as possible. The 
general procedure, including Experiment II (see below), is outlined in 
Table 3.
There were a few variations from the outlined procedure. Two
Table 3 
Outline of Procedure
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Familiarization with family 
(30 minutes)
Equipment set-up and waiting 
period (15-45 minutes)
Equipment set-up and 
waiting period 
(15-30 minutes)
Completion of REEL and 
lexicon count (30 
minutes)






Experiment I, first two toy 
sets (video, 20-25 
minutes)
Experiment I, remaining 
toy set (video, 10- 
15 minutes)





There were a few variations from the outlined procedure. Two 
children in the older group completed the entire procedure on Day 2. 
For these children, the second video taped parent-child activity was 
deleted. A few children also completed Experiment I on Day 2. For 
these children, the video taped visit eliminated the second parent- 
child activity. Hence, a second recorded activity was obtained for 
only nine children. One two-year-old repeated part of an Experiment I 
toy set after Experiment II on Day 3, due to data missing from Day 2 
collection.
Experiment II
Experiment II was designed to assess the impact of changes in 
the activity circumstances of target questions. The overall structure 
of the experiment was rather different from that of Experiment I in 
that the situation did not mimic a normal play session. Experiment I 
constituted a rather normal play activity in that a variety of toys 
was present, the child and experimenter engaged in normally-paced 
play-directed talk, and the questions asked of the child could be 
deemed to concern relevant toy-play and toy-talk. In contrast, 
Experiment II utilized only one or two toys at a time, was rather 
quickly-paced, and was planned to reduce the amount of preceding con­
versation. Experiment II was designed to highlight a contrast between 
orientation to a relevant picture and orientation to an irrelevant 
toy at the time a question is asked. Using this structure, several 
comparisons are afforded: overall circumstances (Experiment I vs.
Experiment II), type of object in focal attention (pictures of
27
Experiment II vs. toys of Experiments I and II), relevance of question 
to object (toys of Experiment II vs. pictures of Experiment II and 
toys of Experiment I).
Subjects. The same subjects who participated in Experiment I 
were utilized for Experiment II.
Materials (toy set). Several small toy packages were constructed 
for use in the experiment. Each pack contained one or two small, 
simple action toys (e.g., small foam ball) and a sturdy picture taken 
from a baby book. The picture in each package illustrated in a very 
obvious way the answer to the target question associated with that 
package. For example, the picture for "What do you do with an apple?" 
depicted a small child eating an apple. In contrast, the toy in each 
package was not appropriate to the target question associated with it. 
However, the toy did provide the child with the opportunity to panto­
mime or act out an action appropriate to the question, using the toy 
as a prop. But in order to do so, the child would have to override 
the 'conventional' action potential of the toy. To extend the previous 
example, there was a small foam ball which the child could pretend to 
eat in place of an apple.
Materials (target questions). As with Experiment I, the target 
questions were generated from Table 1. Each child heard two wordings 
from each frame, but the lexical items were different from the specific 
lexical items that individual child heard in Experiment I, Each child 
therefore heard eight individual target wordings in Experiment II,
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each associated with its own toy package.
General design. After eight toy packages had been selected for 
each child, these were randomized for order of presentation. In the 
course of Experiment II, each question was asked twice in conjunction 
with its package. It was asked once while the child was looking at 
the picture, and once while he or she was looking at the toy. These 
were called Pictures II and Toys II conditions respectively. The 
design resulted in 16 data points for each child, eight in each 
condition.
Procedure. In every case, Experiment II followed Experiment I 
(see Table 3), but for some children it occurred on a separate and 
final day of testing. The rationale for this relative placement was 
to avoid breaking the day-to-day appearance set for Experiment I.
At the beginning of Experiment II, each child was asked to "Come 
see what I have in this bag". The child was allowed to open the bag 
and remove the picture and/or toy. As soon as the child focused on 
one of the items, the question assigned to that package was asked. 
After attention had switched spontaneously to the other item, the 
question was repeated. When the question had been asked for both 
picture and toy, the items were replaced in the package and the child 
offered the next package in the series. The experimenter was instruc­
ted to present all questions without gestures and without preceding 
conversation. Experiment II generally required 15 minutes per child, 
and involved a rather quick progression from package to package 
(approximately one package every 2 minutes). In all cases, toys (T)
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and pictures. (P) were presented in a counterbalanced order of 
TPPTTPPT.... That is, if a child spontaneously removed a toy first 
for the initial package, he or she was next offered the picture, 
followed by the picture from the next package, and so on.
Parent and Child Baselines
Several sources of information were gathered on the communica- 
tional styles of parents, the questioning pattern of parents, and the 
linguistic capabilities and performance of the children involved in 
the sample.
Parental discourse. Three sources of data on parental discourse 
styles were obtained: audiotaped conversation, video taped play
sessions, and a debriefing interview. The first two yielded data on 
actual usage and performance. The last yielded predominantly verbal 
self-reports of usage and the occasional datum pertaining to actual 
usage.
For the last 15-25 minutes of the first one-hour visit to the 
home, a portable cassette recorder was placed in the vicinity of 
parent and child, and the parent instructed to continue or shift to 
a parent-child activity of choice while the interaction was audio 
recorded for later analysis. This recording was later transcribed, 
and the parent's remarks coded for apparent pragmatic function, using 
Shatz's (1979) scheme. As only verbal information (wording and tone 
of voice) was available, only relatively unambiguous cases were coded 
for function. All parental remarks were subsequently classified as
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questions or nonquestions by syntactic and intonational criteria. 
Questions were then identified as either What/Who-questions or other 
questions, (yes/no, other wh-). Ratios were computed for What- 
questions to questions, questions to utterances, and What-questions to 
utterances.
Parents were also video recorded in an activity of their choice 
with their children for five to eight minutes before the beginning of 
Experiment I. For a few children, an additional four minutes of video 
recorded interaction was obtained prior to Experiment II on the second 
day of video taping. Complete transcripts of verbal and nonverbal 
behavior were compiled from these recordings. Question-utterance 
ratios were computed as above. All What/Who-questions produced by a 
parent were identified from the transcript, their gestural accompani­
ments noted, and a pragmatic function assigned.
During the transcription of the final audio recorded debriefing 
interview, any child-directed remarks made by the parent were noted. 
From these remarks, an additional set of question-utterance ratios was 
computed. Discourse functions were assigned to all What-questions 
identified.
During the interview, each parent was asked several questions 
about his or her usage of questions, and of What-questions in particu­
lar. They were asked first what kinds of questions they thought that 
they normally asked their children, and about the activities that 
these questions accompanied. They were requested to report any 
routines or games which regularly accompanied their questions. If 
such information was not volunteered, they were asked if they were 
aware of using any of the target questions and, if so, whether the
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questions: commonly occurred in any games, or routines. Parent's 
responses were transcribed and coded as self-reports of question usage. 
The full interview is presented in Appendix A.
The available transcripts of parent-child talk were thus used in 
the following manner: (1) to give an estimate of the frequency of
What-questions in parental talk addressed to the child, (2) to deter­
mine whether children had had exposure to both testing and directive 
functions in discourse, (3) to determine whether children had had 
exposure to variants of the target questions used in the current 
experiments, (4) to identify the pragmatic functions carried by What- 
questions and variants of target forms in this sample, and (5) to 
identify any candidates for 'routine' What-questions among these 
mother-child dyads. The main purpose was to determine whether or not 
forms like the target questions were in fact used as direct test 
questions by the parents in this sample.
Child language measures. Several sources were used to estimate 
the linguistic capacities and skills of the children involved in the 
experiments. The parent-child transcripts described above were used 
for computing a mean length of utterance (MLU) in words and in 
morphemes for each child. Vocabulary counts were also computed from 
these transcripts, and expanded by asking the parents to list the 
contents of the child's productive lexicon. Parents were also asked 
specifically if their children were known to use the content words of 
the target questions and their canonical answers (e.g., "apple",
"eat"); these words were added to the lexicon count if a parent
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reported that the child used these words spontaneously.
On the first visit, parents and experimenter also completed the 
REEL, an age-graded scale based on parental reports and direct observa­
tions of both productive/expressive language use and comprehension/ 
receptive skills (Bzoch & League, 1971). This results in an expressive 
and a receptive language age (in months) assigned to each child.
Parents were also asked, in the final visit, if they thought that 
their children understood each of the target questions, regardless of 
whether the child had responded correctly in the course of the experi­
ments. These reports, in combination with a consideration of lexicon 
contents, were used to classify children into groups which could be 
expected to answer questions correctly or not.
The characterization of each child’s linguistic skill therefore 
consisted of the following independent measures: (1) productive
language skill as indexed by MLU, (2) productive language skill as 
indexed by expressive score on REEL, (3) receptive language skill as 
indexed by receptive score on REEL, and (4) question-specific skills 
as indexed in parental reports.
The Coding Scheme
The response code is concerned exclusively with the apparent 
function of the child’s response. Theoretically, the function of a 
response is independent of form and content, although in practice 
there may be considerable overlap or redundancy. The primary func­
tional distinction for the stimuli used here is that between action and 
informing— the child can make a response which indicates that he
33
perceived either a directive or an informational intent in the stimu­
lus item and its presentation.
The aim of the code was to classify responses to all stimulus 
types (i.e., both targets and nontargets). Thus all responses to 
experimental stimuli were classified as belonging to the following 
functional types, according to their apparent pragmatic function. 
Interrater reliabilities are summarized in Table 4. All responses to 
Experiment I and II target questions, and to "What's this?" nontargets, 
emitted by one child from each age-sex group were coded independently 
by two raters (one of whom coded the remaining 12 children). Responses 
were originally classified by form and response channel (verbal, non­
verbal, both), and collapsed into the categories listed below. 
Disagreements between raters were resolved by discussion and review of 
the videotaped response. Ambiguities in collapsing data into the 
functional categories outlined below were similarly resolved by 
reviewing the video record. The coding scheme is borrowed from Shatz 
(1978a), with the addition of the conflated and reference categories.
As will be expanded below, the first four classes are considered 
appropriate or meaningful functional types for target questions.
(1) Simple informing— This indicates that the child perceived the 
event as requiring the designation of information. Predominantly, 
these are verbal responses, but may include nonverbal informing 
(indications such as pointing, showing). Also included are yes/no 
responses such as "I don't know", shrugs, and certain other kinds of 
verbal response (e.g., simple verbal deixis, verbal evasions) 
classified as simple informing if they indicated that the child seemed
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Table 4
Interrater Reliability for the Coding Scheme
Category
Index Significance
po Kappa Pe s.e. o(k) z P
Presence
of Response... .921 .680 .756 .026 26.15 .0001
CHANNEL
NVBL only...... .891 .538 .766
VBL only...... .881 .578 .718
Dual Channel.... .780 .556 .504
Overall......... .724 .565 .366 .038 14.87 .0001
NVBL TYPES
Action.......... .868 .738 .497
Orientation.... .783 .584 .478
Indication..... .929 .489 .861
Overall......... .695 .537 .298 .087 6.17 .0001
NVBL = nonverbal modality 
VBL = verbal modality
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to believe that an informing answer was the appropriate response. Not 
all verbal remarks following a stimulus were counted as simple 
informing responses. Some remarks were simple accompaniments or post­
ponements of action responses (e.g., "What does dolly eat?"— Child 
feeds doll and says "Yum-yum"), and hence were not coded as simple 
informing. Only informing responses without responsive nonverbal 
orientation or action were coded as 'simple informing'. Those verbal 
informing responses accompanied by orienting responses were classified 
as 'reference' (see below); those which occurred with an action were 
coded as 'conflated' (see below). A simple informing response is one 
which reflects a simple informational function without action or 
orientation components. It is the appropriate response to target 
questions by structural criteria.
(2) Reference— The child offers a verbal response which is judged 
to conform to an informational intent and that response is accompanied 
by a discrete orienting response to some object in such a manner that 
both the verbal and orientation components appear to be integral to 
the response. This category includes verbal imitations or unclear 
verbal remarks accompanied by orienting responses in cases where the 
child appears to be using the utterance to name or reference the 
object to which he or she orients. Since reference necessarily 
includes orienting to some object, it may indicate a perception that a 
a question is deictic in nature.
(3) Conflation— The response contains a conflation of action and 
informing. Here, 'conflation' is used in the linguistic sense to 
indicate that the child fuses two different responses in one response
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slot. That is, the response contains both an action response and an 
informing component. The child appears to recognize that the question 
has both a directive and testing force. The two components need not 
be simultaneous, but both should follow the question quickly enough 
to be considered as true responses. Relative onsets of action and 
informing components were recorded.
(4) Simple action— generally, the response is nonverbal only, 
with the child performing some action which indicates that he or she 
perceived a directive force. The response may include an initial 
orientation if the action follows shortly; it may not include a verbal 
response which indicates that an informational force was also per­
ceived. It may, however, be accompanied or indexed by a verbal 
response which supports an action interpretation (e.g., "What does 
dolly eat?"— Child says "Wait a minute. I hafta cook."). Simple 
action responses to targets are predicted by a strategic model.
The above four classes are standard response types. A cuing 
model considers all as functionally appropriate for target questions, 
given the pragmatic ambiguity of these questions. In contrast, they 
are not equally appropriate to nontarget stimuli. Only simple acting, 
for example, is appropriate for imperative stimuli. In addition to 
these standard types, there are three classes of responses which are 
not clearly appropriate. An outline of these responses is set out 
below.
(5) Simple orienting— The only response of the child is to shift 
visual orientation to some object, apparently in response to either 
question or gesture. In cases where the child had been oriented
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towards the object concerned before the stimulus presentation, touching 
or picking up of that object is coded as simple orienting. Cases in 
which looking is established prior to the stimulus, and continues 
without change, is not coded as simple orienting (see ambiguous 
responses, below). The orienting response, in order to be counted as 
simple, is not extended by action, nonverbal indication or verbal 
response. Simple orientations, although not standard responses, were 
counted as 'codable' for some analyses, as they are considered as 
meaningful pragmatic responses in the cue utilization literature.
(6) Ignoring— The child offers no response whatsoever to the 
stimulus. On these occasions, the child was judged as giving no clear 
evidence of having heard an utterance or seen a gesture.
(7) Ambiguous— The response is too ambiguous in some way to 
count as a meaningful response. For example, a behavior occurred, but 
the coder felt that its status as a response to the question or 
gesture was highly uncertain and did not warrant inclusion as any of 
the above types. Another instance is when the behavior which occurred 
in the response slot was not sufficiently well articulated to allow 
unambiguous classification as a particular functional type. For 
example, the child appeared to perform some action, but his or her 
back to the camera blocked the coder's view and made accurate 
ascertainment impossible. The remaining ambiguous types were: an 
unintelligible verbal response without accompanying disambiguating 
behavior, visual search of toy space or room without discrete termina­
tion, verbal request for clarification which is not followed by 
further response, confused or blank look, staring or continued
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nonresponsive orientation, and functionally inappropriate verbal or 
nonverbal behavior which nonetheless appeared to be provoked or 
elicited by the stimulus. Each of these particular subtypes was of 
very low frequency (3 to 20 cases of each type out of 768 target 
questions). All responses in this category reflect a lack of prag­
matic clarity on the part of either the coder or the child. For 
some analyses, ambiguous responses were combined with ignorings 
into a class of 'noncodable response' due to (a) low frequencies and 
(b) lack of any theoretical distinction between these two types for 
a distributional analysis.
For some post hoc analyses involving target and nontarget 
stimuli, various codable categories can also be combined. Simple 
informing, reference and conflated responses can be combined to yield 
a general informational index— the overall propensity to offer an 
informational response component. Simple action and conflated 
responses can be combined for a general action index. A similar 
procedure has been employed by Clark' (1979). In addition, reference 




Before any discussion of children's responses to experimental 
stimuli, it is necessary to consider the types of communicative exper­
ience these children have had, and their basic communicative skill as 
indexed by a variety of measures. This is especially the case since 
information about experience and skill is needed to state specific 
hypotheses relevant to the three models of communicative response. 
Hence, what follows is the specification of hypotheses for this sample 
of children.
While general expectancies about children's responses can be 
generated by the structural, strategic, and cue utilization models, 
these expectancies can be modified considerably by knowledge of the 
specific subject group which is offering the responses. There are two 
sources of information which will prove relevant to the fine tuning of 
hypotheses: parental language usage and child language level.
Parental Usage and Reports of What-Questions
A perusal of the available parent-child transcripts indicated that 
over half the sample of children has had substantial experience with 
the two discourse functions which the target questions could express. 
This does not necessarily indicate, however, that these children have 
had experience with What-questions or would be expected to associate 
What-questions with these two functions.
The corpus of parental speech to children totalled 4,082
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utterances. Within the fixed 5-minute video session, a mean of 115.9 
utterances was collected from each parent (SD = 36.26), or 23 utterances
per minute. This talkativeness was manifest across a variety of
*activities of choice— from feeding the child to looking through books or 
albums. From the entire corpus of utterances, 563 What/Who-questions 
were identified, or 35.3 per parent (over approximately one hour of data 
collection). Variability in the frequency of What/Who-questions, 
however, was high (SD = 29.93). Over all transcripts, the proportion 
of questions to utterances was .39, with a range from .15 to .64 (SD = 
.13); the proportion of What/Who-questions to questions was .30, with a 
range of .10 to .54 (SD = .14); the proportion of What/Who questions to 
parental utterances was .12, range .02 to .25 (SD = .08). Because not 
all parents were video taped during the final visit, and because not 
all parents addressed speech to their children during the interview, it 
was not possible to statistically evaluate the effect of data source on 
these proportions. However, the proportions do not appear to change 
substantially across the four sequential sources. The questions/ 
utterances proportions are .44, .34, .41, and .32 for the four succes­
sive situations. The What/questions proportions are .30, .29, .25, and 
.25; the What/utterances proportions are .13, .11, .10, and .17. In 
summary, the relative rates of What/Who-questions in particular and 
questions in general seem to reflect a phenomenon which is relatively 
stable across the observed conditions, but which shows moderate to 
high variability across parent-child dyads. While all children have 
had some exposure to What-questions, the extent of the exposure would 
seem to vary considerably. All ratios and talkativeness are higher
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than those reported for Hardy-Brown, Plomin and DeFries's (1981) sample, 
and the questions/utterances ratio is higher than that reported for 
Lucariello and Nelson's (note 2) sample.
What/Who-questions were overwhelmingly used as test questions by 
all parents of older children (X = 70% of all What/Who-questions). 
Testing was also a common function of What/Who-questions for all 
parents of younger children, although at a significantly lower rate,
X = 59%, (14) = 5.00, jd <.01. In contrast, parents rarely used What-
and Who-questions to express the directive function, X = 2.1% of What/ 
Who's. Parents appear to use the What-questions format as a direct 
test.
What-forms are not evenly distributed across syntactic subtypes. 
Over one-third of all What/Who-questions (X = 34%) were of the routine 
form "Who/What's this?". Variants of target questions accounted for 
12% of all What/Who-forms. The remaining 54% of the What/Who-questions 
demonstrated no particular syntactic pattern, although some parents 
used a simple "What?" as a request for clarification.
Eleven of the sixteen parents were observed to use variants of one 
or more target frames. Most target variants were used as tests (37 of 
the 47 target variants). This indicates that these children, when they 
have had exposure to target forms, have had this exposure under condi­
tions where they are expected to offer informational responses rather 
than action. As mentioned previously, this seems to be true of What- 
questions in general. Most parental target variants were in fact 
worded so as to preclude a test/directive ambiguity. Commonly, a 
variant was inflected as present progressive (e.g., "What are those
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little tigers wearing on their heads?") or past tense (e.g., "What did 
you do?"). These grammatical inflections follow from situations 
wherein directive interpretations were unsupported in any case (e.g., 
looking through a book). However, at least two instances of each 
target frame were observed in functionally ambiguous wordings. Some 
samples of parental usage follow:
Frame 1— What do you wear on your head?
Frame 2— Who goes in the tractor?
Frame 3— What'd you do?
Frame 4— An' whaddaya do with the money?
In the 17 cases like those above, 11 of the questions were used as 
tests, 4 were used as directives and one was indeterminate for test/ 
directive. The remaining case served as an attempt to elicit informa­
tion not possessed by the parent.
Only two parents reported using a target form in a regular game 
or routine. A mother of a younger boy remarked "I say, you know, What 
goes here? ...with puzzle pieces." Her "What goes here?" would be 
considered a variant of frame 2 as its surface form is functionally 
ambiguous (test/directive). A mother of an older girl offered as a 
common interaction "If we're involved in eating breakfast, I'll ask her 
What are you eating for breakfast? or What do you want for break­
fast?." Although the precise wording of these target variants biases 
towards a testing and floor offer function, the response requirements 
are close to those of target frame 3. Eleven of the other parents 
reported nontarget What-question routines, predominantly "What's this?" 
quizzes. While most of the children thus appear to have had some
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exposure to target forms, only two of the 16 are likely to have had 
any concentrated experience.
The relevance of parental usage
These results allow the fine-tuning of hypotheses about responses 
to target questions. Since parents use target forms as direct tests, 
structural theory would predict that children should offer informing 
responses to these forms when presented under felicitous conditions.
That is, children should deal with targets as direct speech acts, and 
not as conventional or implied acts which warrant the computation of 
derived meaning(s).
The relevance of this pattern for the strategic model is not clear. 
Stop-action markers are learned from experience, and "What...?" has 
been suggested as such a marker. However, the parameters of stop-action 
learning have not been established, so it is not possible to state that 
the "What"-testing association should abort the action strategy. A 
strong stance would be that "What...?" is not such a marker, and should 
not prevent children from executing action responses to target ques­
tions.
The predictions of a cuing model rest on the distinction between 
routine and nonroutine forms. While they are direct tests, target 
forms were not used as conversational routines, except by two parents. 
For the group as a whole, then, a cuing model would not predict any 
consistent response pattern. Instead, a scatter of meaningful and 
nonmeaningful responses is expected, with a very slightly raised 
probability of informing-class responses. This should stand in strong
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distinction to the reference responses predicted for the routine 
"What's this?" form.
The three models, then, make unique predictions about the dominant 
function of the responses to target forms, given information on parental 
usage. The structural model argues in favor of informing responses; the 
strategic model predicts a high proportion of action responses; the cue 
utilization model predicts a scatter of responses, with the possibility 
of a slight advantage to informing types of response.
Children's Linguistic Status
The children in this sample were assessed during the initial visit 
and subsequent parent-child interactions on three main language dimen­
sions— receptive ability (RLA, or receptive language age on the REEL 
scale), general expressive ability (ELA, or expressive language age on 
the REEL scale), and utterance production (MLU in words and in mor­
phemes) . The two age groups differed significantly (ELA, _t (14) = 2.79, 
jj <.01; MLU in words, Mann-Whitney IJ = 9, £  <.007) or marginally (RLA, 
t_ (14) = 1.61, .05< £  <.10) on these measures. There were no sex 
differences on any measure, all J t ' s  (14) <1, <.10.
Table 5 presents the main linguistic skill indices for the 16 
children in the sample. For the purpose of comparison with other 
samples, mean length of utterance (MLU) is presented in morphemes. MLU 
in morphemes averaged only .01 higher than MLU in words, indicating 
that the use of by-word calculation for subsequent analyses results in 
no systematic underestimation of these children's productions. The 
younger group of children ranged from Early to Late State I speech on
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Table 5




Age2 MLU3 ELA4 RLA5
YOUNGER
1...... F 18 1.11 24 24
2...... F 19 1.92 27 30
3...... F 20 1.05 20 24
4...... F 21 1.67 30 30
5...... M 17 1.14 22 24
6...... M 19 1.22 22 24
7...... M 19 1.48 24 24
8...... M 19 1.19 20 20
OLDER
9...... F 24 1.39 24 27
10...... F 27 3.04 30 30
11...... F 27 1.76 30 31
12...... F 28 3.09 32 34
13...... M 24 1.57 27 30
14...... M 24 1.94 30 32
15...... M 24 1.56 24 24
16...... M 26 2.55 31 33
1 F = female, M = male
3 in months
3 in words
4 Expressive Language Age, in months
3 Receptive Language Age, in months
46
the basis of MLU (in morphemes); children in the two-year-old group 
ranged from Early Stage I to Early Stage IV. Using a formula derived 
from a large sample (Miller, 1981), it can be noted that all boys in 
the sample fall within one standard deviation of the mean MLU (in 
morphemes) predicted for children from a middle class American popula­
tion. Three girls (# 2, 10, and 12) had higher than predicted MLUs and 
can be considered slightly advanced; three girls (# 3, 9, and 11) had 
MLUs lower than predicted, and can be considered somewhat delayed in 
utterance production, although their general expressive skills (ELA) 
were age-appropriate.
The main measures of language ability utilized for comparison with 
experimental performance were the two REEL scales. Mean length of 
utterances is not logically associated with the ability to produce 
clearly formulated responses to target questions, although it might be 
expected to correlate with factors such as lexicon size and sentence 
comprehension which would be more directly associated with experimental 
performance. Hence, the REEL scales, with their solicited reports of 
lexicon size and comprehension, were used as the main language indices.
It should be noted that, while there are age group differences on 
all measures used, the two groups were not ideally separated in terms 
of language ability. In particular, two one-year-old girls (# 2 & 4) 
exceeded two two-year-old children (# 9 & 15) on all three measures. 
This cross-over allows exchange of these two pairs to form linguistic 
groups rather than age groups. The distinction between linguistic and 
age groups will be raised below.
In the debriefing interview, five parents of older group children
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reported that their children understood all target forms well enough 
to supply an appropriate response. Only one child in the younger group, 
however, had a parent who expected that he could understand all target 
forms. Only two parents, both with children in the younger group, 
maintained that their children could not understand any of the targets 
as they were worded. The remaining seven parents argued that their 
children understood only some of the target questions. In general, 
then, parental reports indicate that the children fall across a range 
of linguistic skill, with no strong floor or ceiling effects for either 
age group and sufficient within-sample variability to allow post hoc 
comparisons and contrasts. The two age groups can be considered as 
moderately distinct in terms of communicative skill. However, the 
relationship between functional aspects of response and independent 
assessments of language skill have never been precisely delineated.
Let us assume that, in a general sense, the difference between the two 
age groups represents a detectable difference in the ability to pro­
cess the literal meaning of target forms. Such a difference would 
result in age-qualifications of hypotheses.
Relevance of language level
Since the ability to derive a primary function is a characteristic 
of a structural model, this model would predict an age-related increase 
in informing responses to target questions. In addition, nonmeaningful 
responses (ignoring, ambiguous responses) should fade with the advent 
of an understanding of grammatical aspects of communicative intent. 
Still, it is not entirely clear that a parent's report that a child
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"understands the question as worded" signifies a level of understanding 
sufficient to derive a fully informed primary meaning. Until the rela­
tionship between grammar and direct speech acts has been more thoroughly 
elucidated, it is a conservative course to invoke the strategic model 
notion that the level of grammatical understanding displayed by two- 
year-olds may not be sufficient to warrant a structural model. In any 
case, the question has an empirical side. If two-year-olds give a very 
high proportion of informing responses, then it may be that they are 
using wording and that a structural model is a valid one for this age 
range. If they do not, then the model is not apporpriate for children 
of this age. The ultimate truth of a structural model is not in ques­
tion here, only its validity for very young children.
The strategic and cue models are less concerned with linguistic 
skill, although they both qualify their hypotheses in the face of 
information about grammatical knowledge. A strategic model predicts 
minor increases in informing responses for more skilled (i.e., older) 
children, and increases in the effect of preceding discourse. A cue 
utilization model predicts increases in conflated responses— responses 
indicative of perceived ambiguity— with the growth of literal under­
standing.
These specific predictions, and the affirmation of such predictions, 
are not critical in the current investigation. The real import is 
framing the question which the following data address. For one- and 
two-year-old children with 'normal' communication development, which of 




Given the general characteristics of the three response models, 
and information on the experience and language level of the subject 
group, specifichypotheses about children's behavior in the experimental 
setting can be constructed. There are four aspects of experiment which 
can be directly addressed: wording context, and age/linguistic skill.
Wording
Over the course of Experiment I, each child was presented with 
four alternative wordings of the same content. These were: (1) impera­
tives, (2) "Can you...?", (3) target What-questions, and (4) "What's 
this?". The three models make differential predictions about children's 
responses.
The predictions of the structural model reflect the formal 
classification of the contexted utterances: (1) imperative cases are 
direct directives, (2) "Can you...?" is a conventional directive, (3) 
targets are direct tests, and (4) "What's this?" is a direct testing 
question (see pp. 3-7). If it can be assumed that the children in this 
sample are in the process of mastering the match between wording and 
primary pragmatic meaning, then the following hypotheses can be con­
structed: (1) imperatives should receive only simple action responses,
(2) "Can you...?" should receive both action and informing types of 
response, (3) target questions and "What's this?" should be answered 
only with informing responses, and the percentage should be close to 
identical.
The strategic model predicts little or no effect of wording for
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children of this age range. According to this model, the dominant 
response to all stimuli should be the simple action response (see p. 9, 
cf. p. 10).
The cue utilization model, because it maintains that routine forms 
will be lexicalized and the nonroutine forms will be perceived as 
ambiguous, makes the following predictions: (1) imperatives and "Can 
you...?" will receive an identically high percentage of simple action 
responses as routine directives, (2) "What's this?" will receive almost 
exclusively informing responses as a routine testing question, and (3) 
responses to target questions will not conform to any other pattern of 
response, since these are not routine questions.
There may be responses to targets which contain both action and 
informing components. Such responses function as a special test case 
for the three models. In a structural system, such responses indicate 
that the classification of targets as direct tests has somehow gone 
awry, and that the questions have been mistakenly computed as implied 
forms (pp. 4-5). Still, the conflated response should preserve its 
natural history of an initial testing function, followed by a derived 
action interpretation. That is, the informing component should precede 
the action component.
The strategic model predicts the reverse. The informing component 
should follow the action response, as if it were an overlaid function 
or a mere confirmation of the action.
A cue utilization model, because it considers nonroutine forms as 
ambiguous, is tolerant of all kinds of directionality in conflated 
responses. If anything, true conflation, or simultaneous production of
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action and informing components is favored as an index that the 
questions are indeed perceived as ambiguous.
Contextual Effects
The only contextual effects of concern to a structural model are 
those which determine whether a primary meaning is felicitous or not 
(pp. 6-7). Since all presentations of target questions were constructed 
so as to be felicitous with a testing interpretation, structural theory 
predicts no effect of the contextual variables (preceding discourse, 
gesture, toy type) manipulated here. That is, the structural model 
predicts that there will be no effect of these contextual aspects.
The strategic model, in contrast, anticipates some effects. If, 
and only if, the preceding discourse is successful in inducing an 
informing response to the discourse which is constructed to operate in 
this manner (i.e., informing discourse), then the preceding discourse 
should affect response (p. 9). Specifically, informing responses 
should follow informing discourse; action responses should follow 
directive and neutral discourse. This pattern is expected to strengthen 
over age. There are no predictions regarding the effects of gesture on 
response. There is a possibility of an effect of toy context. The 
absence of toys may function as a stop-action marker, thus decreasing 
action responses to the Pictures II condition. Hence, the presence of 
a toy effect on action responses would not be contradictory to a 
strategic approach.
The cue utilization model favors the modulation of response 
through contextual cuing. No specific prediction about preceding
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discourse and target response can be made, however, because of the lack 
of empirical investigation into discourse cuing. There are, on the 
other hand, several effects anticipated for gestural cuing. Gesture 
is expected to be taken as a cue for nonverbal response (pp. 11-12). 
Hence, it should raise the probability of all responses which commonly 
contain nonverbal components— reference, conflation of action and 
informing, simple acting and simple orienting. As an attentional 
device also, it should reduce ignoring of target questions by ensuring 
an orientation response at minimum. Toy type should also affect 
response (p.12). Pictures II should be associated with an inflated 
rate of reference and simple informing responses. Note that this is 
somewhat different from the decrease in action responses suggested by 
the strategic model.
Age/linguistic skill effects
The three models can also be used to generate predictions of how 
responses to target forms should change across age or skill. Because 
the target questions are direct testing questions by a structural 
analysis, this model would predict that the dominant response should be 
the simple informing response. This response should strengthen with 
increasing age and grammatical knowledge, replacing responses which 
are not standard. Changes which are more closely related to linguistic 
level are in line with the structural model's emphasis on primary 
functional meaning (pp. 3-6).
If a strategic model is to be validated, children should give 
simple action responses to target questions. This pattern should be
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somewhat stronger in the one-year-old group because it is less likely 
that they would have learned appropriate stop-action markers. One 
pattern would be expected to change with linguistic skill— any effect 
of informing discourse on attenuating action responses should increase 
with linguistic level since the ability to utilize discourse is assummed 
to be a linguistically-based skill (Shatz, 1978b).
The cue utilization model considers the target forms as ambiguous 
in function, and predicts a scatter across standard response types.
As with the structural model, there is an anticipated decrease in 
ignoring and ambiguous responses between one and two years as children 
approach an adult discourse model. Simple orienting responses are also 
expected to decrease with age, as they are supplemented by informing 
and action components (p.13). In addition, it is expected that the 
pragmatic system becomes differentiated with age, with responses 
becoming more closely tuned to contextual cues. Linguistically-based 
cues (preceding discourse) would be associated with increases in lin­
guistic skill, whereas nonlinguistic cues (gesture, toy type) would be 
associated with age-based experiential changes.
As previously mentioned, there may indeed be no effects of age or 
linguistic status, as there are no a priori grounds for determining the 
minimum separation for establishing such effects. The absence of any 
of the above effects, therefore, cannot disconfirm any of the models.
On the other hand, the observation of effects can lend preferential 
support to one of the theories.
Thus, the three response models make differential predictions on 
four counts: the effect or wording on response, the effect of context
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on responses to targets, and age/linguistic effects on response. 
Evidence pertaining to the three models will be presented according to 
each of these areas in turn.
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IV. RESULTS
Responses can be viewed as varying with the wording of a speech 
act, its contextual embedding, or with the age and skill of its 
producer. The actual effects of each of these factors are presented 
below in light of the three response models being entertained.
The Effect of Wording on Response
Each child was presented with three types of nontarget utterance 
in addition to the complex What-questions which formed the main corpus 
of stimuli. These nontarget forms were scheduled not as statistical 
controls, but for descriptive purposes.
Table 6 shows the distribution of functional response types across 
wordings. This table indicates that, functional response type is not 
independent of wording. That is, wording does appear to affect 
response. However, the pattern of response is as critical as the 
existence of an effect.
The pattern does not strongly support the structural model. "Can 
you...?" wordings receive no greater number of conflated responses than 
do the direct imperatives, _t (14) = 1.14 >.10. Nor are the frequencies
of any informing type raised in response to these indirect but conven­
tional forms. While the prediction that targets and "What's this?" 
questions should receive more informing types is borne out, it would 
appear that target forms receive far more action class responses than 
most structural models would find tolerable.
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Table 6
Distribution of Functional Response Types across Target and 
Nontarget Stimuli, Experiment I
Stimulus Type
Response Type Imperative "Can you?" "What's this?" Target
Informing*........ 2% 10% 61% 31%
Conflated......... 6% 13% 8% 23%
Simple action..... 63% 52% 2% 15%
Nonstandard....... 29% 25% 29% 30%
Number of Stimuli.. 48 48 48 768
*includes simple informing and reference responses
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The finding that there is a contingency between wording and 
response does not support a strategic model for children of this age.
This indicates that early investigations were limited to too narrow a
*
range of wordings.
The overall pattern supports a cue utilization model. The 
responses to imperative forms are largely confined to the simple action 
class. This is also true of the "Can you...?" form; the lack of 
difference between imperatives and "Can you...?" indicates that direct 
and indirect directives are perceived as equally direct. "What's 
this?" exhibits a pattern which is different from that of the more 
ambiguous target forms, again in line with the cuing model. Nonstandard 
responses are more or less constant across stimulus types, indicating 
that all forms were equally comprehensible or meaningful to children.
The profile of responses to target questions deserves special 
consideration. In an adult structural model, these are direct test 
questions, and were even used as such by the parents of these children. 
Given that the context is felicitous for a testing interpretations, why 
did these children answer with informing on fewer than one-third of the 
occasions?
It is not simply a matter that some children are appropriately 
offering informing responses whereas other children simply lack the 
pragmatic acumen to respond in the structurally appropriate manner.
Table 7 shows that, while individual patterns do exist, no child 
confined his or her responses to a single pattern. (Age and skill 
effects will be discussed later.) These questions are not assigned a 
unitary pragmatic function, either informing or action, by any child.
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Table 7
Individual Response Profiles *for Target Questions, Experiment I
Response Type
Subject Informing** Conflated Simple Action Nonstandard Total
YOUNGER
1...... 15 19 1 13 48
2...... 14 13 14 7 48
3...... 6 0 13 29 48
4...... 12 7 9 20 48
5...... 15 7 5 21 48
6...... 10 7 9 22 48
7...... 16 2 6 20 48
8...... 17 12 8 11 48
OLDER
9...... 9 20 7 12 48
10...... 27 4 8 9 48
11...... 31 10 3 4 48
12...... 19 24 1 4 48
13...... 1 4 20 23 48
14...... 6 8 8 26 48
15...... 25 19 1 3 48
16...... 19 23 4 2 48
*all data presented as number of responses
**includes simple informing and reference responses
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Rather, they are treated as ambiguous, with children varying their 
responses from occasion to occasion. The overall response profile, 
then, is not consonant with either a structural or a strategic model.
Conflated responses
The rate of conflated response is high enough that adding these 
responses to the category of informing would raise the rate of informing 
to over 50 percent, consequently supporting at least a version of a 
structural model. This can be legitimately accomplished, however, 
only if there is evidence that conflated responses are primarily 
informing responses.
Previous investigations (e.g., Shatz, 1978b) of responses to 
ambiguous questions have generally not distinguished conflated responses 
from unitary function responses, so little information is available on 
this point. Clark (1979) has suggested that, for certain types of con- 
texted utterances, the responder must reply with a literal or direct 
meaning move before he or she responds to the derived or indirect 
meaning, in cases of dual function responses. Although Clark's 
utterance types and contexts were distinctly different from those used 
here, the data partially substantiate his view. While the informative 
portion (the direct meaning by a structural model) of the response was 
instigated prior to the action component (29%) more frequently than the 
reverse (13%), this difference is not significant. Significantly more 
common than either of these was simultaneous, or true, conflation, 58%,
F (2,28) = 24.56, £  <.001.
The rate of primary informative components in conflation does not
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appear to be high enough to warrant classifying conflated responses 
along with clear cases of informing. In other words, it is difficult 
to credit the structural model with additional evidence.
Answering the question
Aside from the lack of a clearly dominant response, I have not 
addressed the strategic model's notion of response heuristics. A 
response heuristic should not result in a reply that is well-tailored 
to the question, except fortuitously. The existence of such strategies 
can thus be tested by dividing the target question set into two classes 
— those questions which require specification of an act (e.g., "What 
do you do with an apple?") and those which require specification of an 
object (e.g., "What do you eat?"). Since the strategic model has 
concerned itself with action responses, it is appropriate to look at 
all responses in which an action occurs (i.e., conflated and action 
responses), examining them in order to determine whether or not they 
are related to the type of question asked. A second possible response 
strategy, one offered by the cue utilization model, is available for 
comparison; all cases of orientation in response (simple orientation, 
most reference responses) can be examined. A third class of nonverbal 
responses, indications (simple informings expressed nonverbally), is 
also available for the investigation of strategy.
Children who are using a nonlinguistic action or orienting 
strategy should not respond differentially according to question type. 
Turning to a functional analysis summarized in Table 8, children do in 
fact respond significantly more often with action to act-required
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Table 8
Percentage of each Question-Requirement Type receiving 
Nonverbal Responses, Experiment I
Question-Requirement
Type of





questions than they do to object-required questions wherein an action 
response is appropriate but superfluous, I? (1,14) = 7.27, jj <.025.
There was also a tendency for children to produce more indication 
responses (pointing and showing) to object-required questions, F (1,14)
= 3.41, p. <*10* Orientation (both simple and accompanying informing), 
on the other hand, appears stable across question type, F (1,14) = 1.25, 
2 >.10. Orientation may be a simple strategy unrelated to the pro­
cessing of linguistic information, but action and nonverbal informing 
may be formulated on the basis of sentential processing. Evidence 
thus seems to indicate that orienting responses are strategies and 
should not be considered as direct answers to questions. To borrow 
Goffman's (1976) terminology, they may be responses, but they are not 
replies. Actions, however, do seem to be valid replies, and not 
strategies at all.
There is no dominant response to target questions. Conflated 
responses to target questions tend to be simultaneously, rather than 
successively, conflated. And the only nonverbal response not clearly 
related to the question (i.e., probably strategic) is orientation, and 
not action. These findings favour a cue utilization model.
Contextual Effects on Responses to Targets
Each target question was presented under six different contextual 
conditions in the course of Experiment I, and under two additional 
contexts in Experiment II. The contexts manipulated were: preceding
discourse (three levels), gesture (two levels), and type of toy (three 
levels). These contexts were designed to test hypotheses generated by
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the structural (no effect on meaningful responses), strategic (informing 
discourse and pictures inhibit action) and cuing (gestural and toy type 
effects) models of response. The effects of the two contextual 
variables manipulated in Experiment I are presented separately from the 
contextual manipulations which spanned Experiments I and II. Age by 
context interactions will be presented in a later section.
Experiment I: Gesture and discourse
The results of Experiment I are presented in Table 9. The effects 
of context will be discussed first in relation to nonstandard responses.
Less than 10 percent of target questions received responses which 
were ambiguous and not codable. There were no context effects.
Slightly over 10 percent of all target questions were ignored.
That is, the child appeared not to have heard the question. A 
discourse by gesture interaction, 1? (2,28) = 15.76, £  <.01, and a main 
effect for gesture, F (1,14) = 11.40, £  <.01, were obtained. Sheffe 
comparisons reveal that gestures significantly reduce ignoring except 
when they follow informative discourse. Informative discourse is 
devoted to engaging the child in looking and talking prior to the 
asking of a question, thus mitigating the attention-securing function 
of gestures.
Simple orienting responses are significantly increased in 
frequency by the presence of a gesture, 1? (1,14) = 5.40, £  <.05.
Simple orientation is sensitive to the presence of a gesture.
No gestural effect was obtained, however, for the simple acting 
response, F_ (1,14) = 2.84, £  >.10. The gestural effect, therefore,
Table 9
Distribution of Functional Response Types by Experimental Condition, Experiment I
Condition
Directive Informational Neutral
Functional Response Gestured NoGest Gestured NoGest Gestured NoGest Total
MEANINGFUL
Simple informing..... 17 26 19 27 12 39 140
Reference............ 18 17 20 9 25 13 102
Conflated............ 28 22 31 28 39 20 178
Simple acting........ 24 19 22 16 19 17 117
NONSTANDARD
Simple orienting..... 15 9 13 6 17 8 68
Ignoring.............. 6 24 13 21 6 23 93
Ambiguous............ 10 11 10 21 10 8 70
Total................... 128 128 128 128 128 128 768
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would not seem to apply to all responses which tend toward nonverbal 
expression.
The presence of a gesture dramatically reduced the frequency of 
simple informing responses, I? (1,14) = 13.12, £  <.005. That is, 
pointing gestures lower the probability of a response reflecting a 
straightforward testing interpretation of the question.
Reference responses also reflect a testing interpretation, but 
one which is embedded in a here-and-now situational context. The 
presence of a gesture seems to encourage such responses, I? (1,14) =
9.23, _g. <.01. Children respond to gestured questions by orienting to 
an object and producing an informing response concurrently, on 
occasion. Recall that simple orientations also are more frequent under 
gestured conditions. Gestures serve to elicit orientation; these 
orientations are, on occasion, accompanied by informing responses to 
the question.
There is a corresponding gestural effect for conflated responses. 
These are also increased by the presence of a gesture, J? (1,14) = 15.36, 
£  <.005.
Response types can be collapsed to allow a more thorough investi­
gation of the role of context in children’s responses. Simple
orienting responses and reference responses can be combined to yield an
index for overall orientation; conflated responses can be combined with 
simple acting responses to yield an overall action index; the addition
of reference and simple informing responses offers an index of
informing rate.
In line with the above effects, the overall rate of orientation is
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increased only by the presence of a gesture, I? (1,14) = 21.10, £  <.001. 
Overall action responses are also more frequent under gestured condi­
tions, F_ (1,14) = 23.98, £  <.001.
However, there is no gestural effect on overall informing 
responses, I? (1,14) = 1.44, £  >.10. A gesture may inhibit the produc­
tion of purely informative responses, but it does not seem to be taken 
as a cue that an informational response is not appropriate.
Responses to setting sequences. In order to assess the effect of 
the preceding discourse on children, children's responses to setting 
sequences were examined. Responses to the imperative or declarative 
sentences immediately preceding targets were coded as action, as 
attentive looking or talking, or as uncodable due to uncertain atten­
tiveness, gaze direction, or conflation of response. As indicated in 
Table 10, approximately three-quarters of the setting sequences were 
responded to in a functionally appropriate manner. Cases in which a 
child responded with action to declarative setting sentences were rare; 
cases of simple attentiveness or talking in response to imperative 
setting sentences did not occur. Approximately 17% of all setting 
sequences offered were clearly ignored, a rate similar to that observed 
in response to the target questions (13%). Children do not appear to 
be ignoring the setting sequences as a rule, and they are generally 
responding to the sequences in a functionally appropriate manner. The 
lack of preceding discourse effects on subsequent responses to target 
questions cannot be attributed to the child's functional set preceding 
the targets. Children are, by and large, responding to the preceding
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Table 10
Type and Number of Responses to Setting Sequences, Experiment I
Directive Set Informational Set
Subiect Acts Look/Talks Ignores Acts Looks/Talks Ignores
YOUNGER
1.... 11 0 5 0 9 4
2.... 12 0 4 0 13 3
3.... 10 0 5 0 11 4
4.... 2 0 2 0 7 1
5.... 6 0 0 2 4 0
6.... 11 0 3 0 9 1
7.... 12 0 3 1 12 2
8.... 14 0 1 3 9 7
--- 1 — —
% codable
responses 77% 0% 23% 3% 75% 22%
OLDER
9.... 10 0 5 0 6 7
10.... 13 0 2 0 7 3
11.... 14 0 0 0 9 2
12.... 14 0 1 0 11 2
13.... 13 0 1 2 6 3
14.... 13 0 3 0 8 6
15.... 14 0 2 0 12 4
16.... 14 0 1 3 11 1-- — -- - — *
% codable
responses 87% 0% 13% 5% 68% 27%
Note: Each child was given 16 directive settings and 16 informational
settings, but response to the setting was not coded in cases 
where attentiveness, direction of gaze, or function of response 
was not clear.
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discourse, but this does not seem to affect their responses to target 
What-questions.
Summary of Experiment I data. The above analyses converge on 
two basic principles.
(1) A gesture induces an orienting response.
(2) Although children attended to the discourse which preceded What- 
questions, this discourse did not affect the function of their 
responses to the questions themselves.
Experiment I vs. Experiment II; Toy type
Following completion of Experiment I, each child participated in a 
second experiment. The target question frames used in this experiment 
were identical to those used in Experiment I, although an individual 
child did not hear the same wordings in the two experiments. Each 
child was, as in Experiment I, asked to respond to two wordings of each 
question frame. Each wording was presented twice, once in conjunction 
with a relevant picture and once in conjunction with an irrelevant toy. 
For comparison with Experiment I data, data from Experiments I and II 
were converted to percentages. For the most common comparison, that of 
Experiment I to Toys II to Pictures II, the ratio of questions asked 
was 6:1:1.
Some analyses were confounded by the experimenter's deviation from 
the Experiment II script. Although all questions were to be asked as 
if they were Neutral-NoGesture, an examination of the video records 
revealed systematic drifts towards informative discourse and gesturing.
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Table 11 presents the deviations from the scripted Neutral-NoGesture 
context of Experiment II, expressed in terms of the number and percen­
tage of questions which were not embedded in a Neutral-NoGesture 
context.
A drift is apparent for questions associated with pictures. It 
has been noted by Murphy (1978) and Ninio and Bruner (1978) that 
mothers use informative discourse and pointing when looking through 
books with their children. This seems to capture much of what the 
experimenter is doing. If the present data are any indication, the 
tendency to talk informatively and point while looking through books 
with little children is fairly strong and overrides procedural instruc­
tion not to do so. Shifts to informative discourse account for 32% of 
all deviations. Although these shifts were more frequent for pictures 
than for toys, this effect was not significant, > ( 1 )  = .01, £  > .10.
Since no experimental effect was found for discourse type in 
Experiment I, the slight shift to informative talk here is probably of 
no consequence. Questions inadvertantly preceded by informative dis­
course in Experiment II received a 61% rate of informing overall, com­
pared with 67% of questions not so preceded. The lack of a discourse 
effect revealed in Experiment I also seems to show up in Experiment II, 
at least for informative discourse. The relatively high rate of 
gesturing, in contrast, may very well affect interpretation of Experi­
ment II data. In Experiment I, gestures raised the frequency of 
orienting responses, while lowering the frequency of simple informing 
responses. However, Experiment II was structured to preclude a great 
number of orientation responses (by ensuring that orientation was
Table 11
Number of Target Questions by Contextual Embeddings, Experiment II
Type of Contextual Embedding
Directive Informative Neutral





Pictures II.... 1 1 30 24 24 48 128 63%
Toys II....... 1 1 2 27 14 83 128 35%
Percent
Deviation..... 1% 1% 13% 20% 15% NA 256 49%
Note: Neutral-NoGesture was the scripted condition of presentation. Hence, deviations are deviations
away from this type of contextual embedding.
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established prior to the question).
Codability. Is Experiment II, as a distinctly non-normal context 
and interaction, confusing to the children in the sample? Apparently 
not. The percentage of codable responses (meaningful responses and 
simple orientations) is presented in Table 12. There are no effects of 
experiment type, _F (2,28) = 2.54 £  > .10. Recall, however, that fewer 
of the Experiment II than Experiment I questions were gestured, when 
compared with all other data cells. Gestures in Experiment I were 
associated with a higher frequency of codable responses, due to the 
association between gestures and the orienting response. In Experiment 
II, therefore, the rate of codable response was examined across ges­
tural accompaniments of target questions. Codable responses occured at 
approximately 71% regardless of the presence of a gesture, X  (1) =
.002, £  >.10. Since the structure of the experiment biases against 
the orientation to gesture by ensuring orientation prior to stimulus 
presentation, the gesturing directed to children does not seem to be of 
consequence in experimental comparisons.
Function of response. In place of exclusive function indices, 
general function indices were used to avoid problems of low frequencies. 
Table 13 shows that type of experiment did not affect the percentage of 
questions which received informing response components, _F (2,28) =
1.29, £  >.10.
There is a more striking effect of experimental type on the per­
centage of action responses, F (2,28) = 53.67, £  <.001. Here Scheffe 
comparisons reveal that each experiment type elicits a distinctly
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Table 12
Percentage of Questions receiving Codable Responses* in 
Experiments I and II
Experiment Type
Age Group Experiment I Toys II Pictures II Total
Younger...... 72% 74% 63% 71%
Older..... . 82% 75% 72% 79%
Total........ 77% 74% 67% 75%
*Meaningful responses and simple orientations combined
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Table 13
Percentage of Questions receiving Response 
Components in Experiments I and II
Experiment Type
Component Experiment I Toys II Pictures II Total
Informing.... 55% 56% 64% 56%
Action....... 39% 26% 2% 32%
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different rate of action responses. Hence there is some indication that 
children are tailoring action responses to linguistically encoded input. 
The rate of action responses to the inappropriate Toys II questions is 
not very high, being midway between that for appropriate toy-contexted 
questions and that of appropriate picture-contexted questions. It would 
thus appear that children are capable of perceiving mismatches between 
linguistic content and object context in the selection of a response, 
although they do not always make that connection. That What-questions 
do not automatically stimulate action responses is reflected in the 
almost total absence of action responses in the Pictures II condition.
Summary of Experiment II data. The following represent the main 
points of Experiment II performance.
(1) The protocol for asking questions in a 'neutral' setting was not 
followed by the experimenter. Almost one-half of the questions asked 
while the child was looking at a picture was preceded by informational 
discourse. Furthermore, many questions directed at children were 
accompanied by gestures. It appears difficult not to talk about 
pictures when looking through them with children. Additionally, it 
seems difficult to inhibit gestures while talking with very young 
children.
(2) On a very global level, the experimental procedure did not seem to 
be confusing to the children. Experiment II questions received the 
same percentage of codable responses as Experiment I questions. This 
lack of effect did not appear to be attributable to the protocol 
deviations mentioned above.
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(3) The rate of informing-class responses did not vary across experi­
ment, with slightly over one-half of all questions receiving informing 
components.
(4) Action interpretations, in contrast, were sensitive to such contex­
tual variations. These interpretations are essentially absent when a 
child is looking at a picture; they occur in response to about one- 
quarter of target questions asked while the child is attending to an 
irrelevant toy; and they occur to approximately one-third of target 
questions asked during a normal play session.
Summary of Contextual Effects
The absence of a preceding discourse effect on response supports a 
structuralist model of question response and disconfirms a strategic 
model, in light of children's appropriate responses to setting sequen­
ces. As previously mentioned, the cue utilization model has taken no 
stance on the effect of preceding discourse. Hence, there is no 
evidence for or against this model on this point.
The presence of a gestural effect can be viewed as evidence 
against the structuralist model. The strategic model makes no firm 
commitments about the effects of gesture. Therefore, the gestural 
effect provides weak evidence against this stance. The effect does 
support a cuing model in that the presence of a gesture affects the 
production of orientation-accompanied responses and conflated responses.
The effect of toy activity on action response components favors 
both a strategic and cue utilization model. The constancy of informing 
components, however, is in line with a structural model.
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While all models can be supported to some extent by various dimen­
sions of the results, only the cue model is not faced with some contrary 
facts. As with wording, then, the data seem to favor a cue utilization 
model. However, a final decision must await an analysis of how 
responses change across age and linguistic skill.
Age/Linguistic Skill Effects
The responses to target questions, broken down by age, are dis­
played according to the fully differentiated response code in Table 14. 
The response pattern can still be seen as a scatter, exhibiting no 
strong tendency to favor a structrualist or strategic model. But there 
are age trends of interest in these data. Age and skill effects will 
be discussed by three main topics: (1) simple age effects, (2) age vs.
language grouping, and (3) age interaction effects.
Simple age effects
Many responses which reflected an ambiguity or lack of clarity on 
either the coder's or the child's part were scattered thinly but evenly 
over the subtypes of this category. As Table 14 indicates, younger 
children gave significantly more of these unclear or ambiguous respon­
ses than did older children, 1? (1,14) = 6.66, j) < .025. This suggests 
that with increasing age, children's responses show greater convergence 
with the adult pragmatic system in that they are better able to produce 
responses that are clear and easily interpreted by an adult observer, 
and which fall into functionally appropriate categories.
There are no other significant simple age effects.
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Table 14













Simple informing.... 64 (17%) 76 (20%) 140 (18%)
Reference............ 41 (11%) 61 (16%) 102 (13%)
Conflated............ 67 (17%) 111 (29%) 178 (23%)
Simple action....... 65 (17%) 52 (14%) 117 (15%)
Simple orienting.... 49 (13%) 19 (5%) 68 (9%)
Ignoring............. 48 (13%) 45 (12%) 93 (12%)
Ambiguous............ 50 (13%) 20 (5%) 70 (9%)
Total 384 (101%) 384 (101%) 768 (99%)
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Age vs. language grouping
Earlier, it was suggested that, instead of age-group classifica­
tion, children could be classified into two nonoverlapping linguistic 
skill groups. Certain linguistic skill effects, even in the absence of 
age effects, could be construed as support for a structural theory 
predicted on a primary, grammatically-based function. That is, 
although age group analyses reveal few main effects of age, it may 
still be worthwhile to group children by linguistic criteria. But on 
12 selected dependent variables, in no case did regrouping children 
into two linguistic groups (MLU = 1.6 +) result in a greater between- 
group difference. On nine of these variables, the between-age 
differences were larger than the between-linguistic group differences. 
On a two-tailed sign test, this group criterion effect is significant, 
£  < .004. For the range of children selected, age differences result 
in stronger effects than do differences in linguistic skill.
Although this pattern is suggestive, the difference is between 
marginal to nonsignificant effects and even smaller effects. It is 
likely that a somewhat wider separation between age groups would have
resulted in a greater number of significant age effects, but such a
separation would also dispense with the age-linguistic group cross­
over obtained. Despite significant differences in the linguistic 
skills of the two age groups, the group effects suggested by these




Age was involved in four different but ultimately interrelated 
interactions.
First, there is an interaction between age and gesture in the 
offering of responses which contain action components, 1? (1,14) = 6.72, 
2. < .025. Scheffe comparisons reveal that only older children offer an 
elevated number of action-class responses to gestured questions. That 
is, action components are produced most frequently by two-year-old 
children under gestured conditions.
Since there is no interaction between age and gesture for simple 
action responses, this result is largely attributable to an age by 
gesture effect on conflated responses, F (1,14) = 6.67, 2  < *025.
Table 15 shows that, when older children observe gestured target utter­
ances, they double their rate of conflated response. These results 
are not in line with the strategic model's prediction of a developmen­
tal increase in sensitivity to stop-action markers.
The third age interaction effect is also associated with conflated 
responses. Two-year-olds produce a much higher rate of true or 
simultaneous conflation than do one-year-olds, 1? (1,28) = 13.03, 2  < 
.001. As Table 16 suggests, older children may tend to interpret 
target questions as truly ambiguous.
Only three children from the younger group responded with two 
components simultaneously more frequently than with first one component, 
then the other. Every child in the older group did so. This ability 




Number of Action-Class Responses by Age and 
Gestural Condition, Experiment I
Gestural Condition
Response Gestured No Gesture Total
Younger
-
Simple acting... 35 30 65
Conflation..... 36 31 67
Total........ 71 61 132
Older
Simple acting... 30 22 52
Conflation.... . 72 39 111
Total........ 102 61 163
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Table 16
Directionality of Response Components in the Conflation of 
Action and Informing, Experiment I
Direction of Response Components
Group Action— > Informing Simultaneous Informing— > Action Total
Younger.. 21% 41% 38% 100%
Older.... 8% 67% 25% 100%
Total 13% 58% 29%
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linguistic sophistication, since the two linguistically advanced girls 
in the younger group were clear one-reply-at-a-time responders.
This increase in true conflation may he due to an increase in the 
ability to perform any two responses simultaneously, as an identical 
effect obtains for reference responses. Older children, when they 
offer a reference response, look and inform at the same time, while 
younger children do not do this any more frequently than the remaining 
two directionality patterns, interaction T_ (1,28) = A.42, £  < .05, 
Scheffe comparisons.
Summary
Not only is there no dominant functional response to target 
questions, but there are only two simple age-or skill-related changes 
in response. The decrease in ambiguous responses with age can be 
handled by either a structuralist or a cuing model. The increase in 
simultaneous conflation lends a slight advantage to the cuing model, 
as it may indicate advances in the perception of ambiguity, or at 
least in the ability to express such interpretations. The lack of 
linguistic group effects does not disconfirm a structuralist model, 
but neither does it lend any direct support, especially in light of 
linguistic group differences which are smaller than age group differ­
ences. An increasing ability to exploit contextual cues is consonant 
with both the strategic model and the cue utilization model; since 
this increase is towards, rather than away from, action responding, 
the latter model would seem more appropriate.
Overall, the developmental phenomena presented by these data are
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most easily accommodated by the cue utilization model. Change is 
towards the abandonment of ambiguous responses, towards a facility in 
producing unitary responses out of disparate components, and towards 
exploiting gesture as an interpretive cue.
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V. DISCUSSION
Whenever there is talk, there are questions and responses. 
Questions and responses, taken together, are frequently considered to 
form a minimal dialogic unit— the adjacency pair (Churchill, 1978; 
Goffman, 1976; Sacks, note 3). A common investigative procedure is to 
collect samples of such adjacency pairs and examine how the response 
(even silence) serves as an answer or rejoinder to the question. What 
is often given perfunctory consideration, but rarely systematic 
attention, is which properties of the question and its situation are 
related to the response.
There are three models for how conversational participants 
produce contextually-embedded responses to questions and which aspects 
of an interaction are critical in question-response contingencies.
The first model emphasizes the role of literal understanding and 
rather abstract aspects of the communicative situation, the second the 
cognitive nature of the interactants, and the third the role of 
learned, observable markers of intentionality.
Sources of Variation
In this investigation, three types of evidence were assembled in 
order to assess the validity of the response models. The first is the 
effect that the wording or syntactic form of the stimulus has on 
children's responses; the second, the effects of context on responses 
to one of those syntactic forms; the third, the presence of develop­
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mental effects on responses to the targeted syntactic form.
Wording
Equivalent contents were worded in four different ways: as 
imperatives, "Can you" questions, "What's that", and as complex What- 
questions. We already know that young children's responses vary with 
question form (e.g., Dore, 1977; Ervin-Tripp, 1970), but those data 
have come largely from natural sources, and not ones in which content 
and context were controlled. The items used here were presented under 
conditions which support the following structural assignments: direct 
directive (imperative), conventional directive ("Can you...?")> and 
direct test ("What's that?" and complex What-questions).
Wording as a source of variation in response is a central concern 
of the structual model. As outlined earlier, theoretical work has 
emphasized the importance of a functional assignment on the basis of 
literal meaning as a component in the interpretation of speech acts 
(see especially, Searle, 1975). Performance models based on structural 
theory, consequently, have focused on confirming that literal meaning 
is processed (e.g., Carrell, 1981; Clark, 1979; Clark & Lucy, 1975; 
Clark & Schunk, 1980). Hence, if the validity of the structural model 
is to be verified, it is essential that children's responses be shown 
to vary with the syntactic form of an utterance.
The strategic model, in contrast, generates the proposal that 
there should be few consistent effects of wording on response. One- 
and two-year-olds are presumed to lack the necessary syntactic and 
pragmatic abilities (Shatz, 1978b). While there may exist some
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emerging linguistic skills in children of this age, the strategic model 
is not likely to be appropriate if there are strong effects of wording 
on response.
In contrast to strategic theory and in alignment with the struc­
tural model, the cue utilization model considers wording to be an 
important source of variation in interactional response. But since 
this effect is mediated by factors different from those associated with 
structural models (Cole, 1974; Sadock, 1972), the predicted wording- 
response pattern is discriminably different from that suggested by a 
structural analysis.
Context
When context is entertained as a source of variation in inter­
actions, it must be made clear what types or aspects of context are 
under consideration. All three models incorporate the notion of con- 
textedness as essential to human communication. But there are dis­
agreements over what aspects of the total interaction can be expected 
to have an impact on the participants. The complex What-questions used 
in the current experiments were presented while three aspects of 
context were manipulated— the pragmatic function of the discourse 
which immediately preceded the question (directive, informational, 
neutral), the gestural accompaniment of the question (pointing at 
referent, no gesture), and the toy activity in which the question was 
embedded (semistructured play, orientation to a single irrelevant 
action toy, orientation to a picture illustrating the question).
Because the target questions were consistently presented under
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conditions which support a direct testing interpretation (pp. 6-7), and 
because the above mentioned contexts are not of the type which struc­
tural theorists emphasize (p. 7), the structural model suggests that 
children's responses should not vary with these contexts. That is, 
while the notion of context is a crucial one for structural theory, it 
would not consider the types of context manipulated here to be an 
important source of variation in interaction.
The strategic model, in contrast, suggests that some of these 
contexts might affect response. Contexts which could operate through 
the direct inhibition of the action heuristic are considered as poten­
tial sources of variation (p. 9). Informational discourse might 
operate in this manner, as could the absence of a toy upon which to act. 
The absence of a relevant toy upon which to act should tend to inhibit 
action, but this affect would be relatively weak for children of this 
age.
The cue utilization model also considers context, especially of 
the types manipulated here, as a source of response variation. The 
mechanism suggested is rather different from that mentioned above. 
Instead of operating via response inhibition, context is presumed to 
elicit direct functional responses (p. 13).
Developmental level
The final source of variation in these experiments is the develop­
mental level of the participants. While the questioner remained the 
same for all, the children belonged to two different age groups (one- 
and two-year-olds) and fell across a range of linguistic development.
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The structural model is largely static and nondevelopmental. 
However, processing models developed from structural speech act theory 
can be used to generate developmental hypotheses. Most importantly, 
linguistic status should be a detectable source of response variation. 
The predicted change is from nonstandard responses to informing res­
ponses. However, it is only fair to note at this point that the 
structural theories are end-point models and characterizations of 
adult competency, and.so cannot rise or fall according to the tra- 
jectory of very early development.
Strategic theory provides a counterpoint in that its predominant 
concern is with age-related phenomena. Specifically, it postulates a 
developmental decrease in action responding. This decrease is expected 
to be especially apparent in action-inhibitory contexts (e.g., after 
informative discourse). One can assume that this decrease accompanies 
age-related increases in informing-class responses.
Assuming convergence with the adult system, the cue utilization 
model aligns with the structural model in anticipating developmental 
decreases in nonstandard responses. But because the cuing model has 
little investment in either speech act classification or literal force 
indicators, it does not argue that this and other changes are neces­
sarily linked to changes in grammatical skill and understanding. In a 
developing organism, expanding symbol usage is not the only aspect of 
growth which affects behavior. Individual history and experience may 
result in patterns which are not directly associated with what is 
traditionally regarded as linguistic growth. For this reason also, the 
developmental patterns may not resemble an appropriate structural
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course. Responses may reflect variations in a variety of developmental 
indices (e.g., age, linguistic status). They do so because children's 
conceptions of the pragmatic system change as they negotiate their way 
towards an integration of wording, context, and pragmatic function.
The importance of the three sources of variation differs for the 
three models of pragmatic response. While each model can be used to 
generate some hypothesis about the role of these independent variables, 
the variables are not necessarily of equal concern to the three models. 
Wording is of prime concern to structural models, developmental effects 
to the strategic model, and context to the cue utilization model.
While each factor in turn may not be of equal relevance to all models, 
the manipulation of all three may nonetheless allow the selection of 
one model over the others as the model which best characterizes the 
interactional skills of very young children.
Patterns of Evidence
The structural model acquires limited support from the data 
presented here. When the same content was worded in different ways, 
children used the wording of a message to formulate a response. In 
response to imperative wording, a direct encoding of directive intent, 
children generally offered simple acting responses. The same was true 
for the most common conventional directive of maternal speech— the 
"Can you" question. In contrast, the direct test "What's this?" 
received predominantly informing responses. But the data are not 
uniformly supportive. The literal meaning of "Can you...?" questions 
carries an informing force, but there is little tendency for these
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children to misinterpret these questions as information requests. One 
might expect such errors from learners, but they do not occur with 
appreciable frequency. On the other hand, the targeted What-questions, 
despite structural conventionality and parental use for direct conven­
tional informational functions, appeared to be recognized by children as 
pragmatically ambiguous or nonconventional in wording and in context. 
These children appear, then, to be making a large number of interpretive 
errors for questions which, structurally, are much more straightforward 
than "Can you...?" questions. The overall pattern of response to 
wording variations is not particularly encouraging for structural 
theory.
An equivocal pattern also emerges when the effects of context on 
response are considered. Because the target questions were presented 
under conditions which support a testing interpretation, these questions 
can be classified as direct tests under a structural model. Since 
direct speech acts do not warrant further context-checking action (and 
the model de-emphasizes the role of concrete conditions in any case), 
the variables manipulated in the present experiments should have no 
impact on responses. In fact, there is no effect of preceding discourse, 
and this finding supports a structural interpretation. However, gesture 
and toy type do affect response, and this argues against the model's 
validity.
Somewhat more clearly, age and linguistic status effects do not 
support a structural model. The effect of one contextual variable—  
gesture— increases rather than decreases with age. Linguistic status, 
at least within the range sampled here, is not related to response.
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Furthermore, linguistic status groupings result in less separation than 
do age groupings, when magnitude of group divergence is the criterion.
The experimental data, then, do not align with a structural speech 
act model of communicative interaction, at least as specified in the 
performance terms used here. While children do attend to the wording 
of speech addressed to them and while they do generally offer structur­
ally meaningful replies, there is little evidence that their responses 
reflect a system of structured relationship among wording, abstract 
contextual conditions, and logic.
The picture is little better for the strategic model of adult- 
child interaction. While children do offer structurally-unwarranted 
action responses to What-questions, such responses do not occur with 
very high frequency. This cannot be attributed to the acquisition of 
"What...?" as a stop-action marker, since no child showed anything 
approaching complete inhibition of action-class responses to target 
questions. Similarly, an examination of directionality in conflated 
responses indicates that action responses tend to follow or coincide 
with informing responses, rather than precede them.
Proponents of the strategic model argue that context serves only 
to inhibit action, and not to prompt it. It is true that orientation 
to pictures can reduce the frequency of action responses. These child­
ren, however, did not inhibit direct action responses when deliberately 
involved in informing-type interactions which are embedded in a play 
setting. The third contextual variable, gesture, actually served to 
increase the rate of conflated responses. This finding cannot be 
explained by a simple strategic model.
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With respect to age and status changes, there is no evidence of a 
developmental weakening of action responses. Nor is there any increas­
ing exploitation of stop-action markers. While it is true that sensi­
tivity to one cue increases with age, this change is toward exploitation 
of a pro-conflation cue, and not a stop-action marker.
Although these children are very young, a strategic model of inter­
action does not seem appropriate. They evidence a sense that the target 
questions require informing responses or that, at least, they are
ambiguous. If there ever was an impulse to act in a physical sense, it
has been left far behind.
Obviously, neither model is clearly supported by the data. The 
most common response to targets overall was the conflated response, 
followed by the simple informing response, the simple acting response, 
and reference, in that order and excluding nonstandard types. The 
differences in frequency, however, are not strong and are not consistent 
for both age groups. There is little or no evidence to favor either a
purely strategic or purely structural model in these data.
Rather than a simple structural speech act model or a simple stra­
tegy model, the following pattern seems to apply to these data. By 
the time children begin to talk, the action response is largely con­
strained to those forms which are routine directives. By this time, 
the reference response is clearly associated with the most common 
routine test question. In cases where the linguistically encoded 
message does not warrant a routine interpretation, one-year-olds 
scatter their responses haphazardly across potentially appropriate prag­
matic types and a few inappropriate ones. In the same situation, two-
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year-olds are more systematic in that they attempt to use contextual 
cues in selecting either a direct (informing) or nonconventional 
(action) response.
In place of a simple structural or a simple strategic model, these 
data suggest that responses offered by language-learning children .best 
fit an intermediary pattern. There is indeed development towards an 
adult-like pragmatic system, in that structurally appropriate responses 
would seem to account for a greater proportion of answers offered by 
two-year-olds than by one-year-olds. There is also evidence for a 
response 'strategy1, although it is not the same strategy identified by 
Shatz. But the essence of these children's responses is best captured 
by a model wherein responders are influenced by the presentation of 
discrete linguistic and situational cues in their selection of a 
pragmatic response. This is precisely the model suggested by Austin 
(1975) for characterizing actual performance rather than theoretical 
structure.
It is appropriate to return to Austin and borrow his statement 
that what is said here is neither difficult or contentious. Most 
structuralists would not be disturbed by the observation that the 
performance of very young children cannot be predicted completely by 
structural theory. Structural theory is, after all, a theory of logic 
and linguistics, the construction of proofs for how it is possible that 
language can be used to certain ends— in short, a competence theory. 
That there are performance phenomena that exceed the parameters of the 
preformulated system would not be particularly disturbing to most 
structuralists. Yet these findings indicate that the performance 
models developed from structural theory are not entirely adequate.
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The easiest modification to such models would be the incorporation of 
additional kinds of contextual conditions into the level at which 
felicity conditions are evaluated. For example, an adult-child play 
context such as that used here might function to alert the child to the 
possibility that directive interpretations may be warranted even when 
the defining conditions for a direct test are met. A structural model 
might lose some clarity, but it would certainly gain validity as a 
description of performance by incorporating at least some features of 
cue utilization.
On the other hand, the current findings are already consistent 
with the cuing model and with contextualist theories in general. As 
Cicourel (1980) has pointed out, communication can be viewed as part of 
a complex, multifaceted system. Action and discourse are embedded in 
and sustained by layers of context ranging in globality from eye gaze 
to sociocultural setting. The meaning of any act, therefore, must be 
at least partially defined in terms of external conditions that go 
beyond the surface linguistic information of the act itself. Although 
these data support such a contextualist view of adult-child discourse 
and can be taken as a contribution to the contextualist study of action, 
they highlight some problems with the contextualist approach. First of 
all, the contextualist view tends to shortchange the role of intention- 
ality in action, a bias consistently combatted only by Goffman (1959, 
1967, 1969, 1981). Unlike the structuralist approach, contextualism 
obscures the essential intentions of speakers and responders, focusing 
instead on observable behaviors such as gesture and gaze. While the 
study of natural discourse is incomplete without the consideration of 
such overt behavioral cues, one is frequently left with little
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understanding of what was actually intended by an act or how that act 
was indeed perceived. Second, perhaps due to this de-emphasis of 
intentionality as a cohesive force, contextualist theories are somewhat 
dispersive. There have been few attempts to organize findings about 
different facets of context into a coherent predictive system. It is 
likely that any adequate systematization would have to include aspects 
of structural theory (e.g., communicative intent).
There are two options here. Structural theory can accommodate 
overt contextual- cues into performance models, but the adaptation might 
not be an easy one; contextual cuing theory assimilates new evidence 
rather easily, but does so by simply adding it to the list rather than 
by assigning it a consistent and meaningful role in a larger view of 
communicative intentions. How these data are aligned depends on the 
world views of those who evaluate them. For those who view discourse 
as an exemplar of human rationality, children's sensitivity to wording 
and gesture are best seen as a step towards understanding a system that 
is coherent and structured. Conversely, investigators approaching any 
human act as reflecting emergent properties of social interaction may 
see children's performance as revealing a movement towards a subtle 
system of contexted discourse. To date, there have been few efforts to 
integrate the clear formalisms of structural theory and the local 
production properties of contextual cuing theories. There is little 
doubt that a unified, integrated theory would be a worthwhile endeavour, 
expanding the scope and applicability of structural theory while 
lending intentionality and coherence to cuing models.
In such an integrated theory, the ability to respond to messages 
would be seen as a counterbalancing of constraining forces which are
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internal (child perceptions and knowledge) and external (pragmatic cues 
and structures). The children in this sample are attempting to 
negotiate their way through an incompletely understood structured system 
by organizing some available surface cues into a simple scheme for 




Before I tell you some of the thing I was looking for, I would like to 
ask you some questions about how you talk to your child:
What sort of questions do you ask your child? For example, do you ask 
a lot of "What’s this?" questions, or a lot of "What does a cat say?" 
questions?
Do you think that your child knows the words I used in my questions, 
and the words he or she would need in order to answer the questions 
verbally? Does s/he know the names of common animals? objects? 
foods? clothing? Does s/he use the words, or merely understand them 
when others use them?
Let's go over the four types of questions I used, and you tell me 
whether you would expect your child to give a good answer: (a) almost
every time it was asked, (b) only in certain phrasings or in certain 
situations, or (c) not at all, i.e., you would be surprised if s/he 
gave a good answer. (Go over each question type). Why do you think 
s/he could/could not answer these questions?
Do you have any question, naming, or action games that you often play 
with your child? What are they? Are those games any different from 
the games you used to play? For example, did you use to play a lot of 
"Where’s your nose?” or "What’s this?" games, but now play a lot more 
"What colour is this?" or fantasy games? How* do/did you use these 
games?
Does your child name things spontaneously, or ask for the names of
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objects and people? Is this a frequent occurrence?
What kinds of play does your child engage in? Does s/he imitate 
people, objects, and actions after the fact? For example, does s/he 
pretend to go to sleep when it's not bedtime, or pretend to feed dolls, 
or pretend that objects are something entirely different? Any make- 
believe or pretend play of any sort? Is your child familiar with the 
toys I brought to your house?
Does your child imitate what you say, either immediately or much later? 
If s/he does, is it appropriate? Some children imitate words and 
sentences when they are confused, or when they don't know how to 
answer a question— does your child ever do this?
I asked your child questions designed to determine how children of this 
age answer some kinds of questions. Most of the questions are 
questions which can be answered by an action or by talk. I wanted to 
know how children decide which way to respond, if they respond at all. 
Now no child ever answers all the questions appropriately, so I have 
one last question before you ask me whatever you want: what would you 
do if you asked a question like one of these and your child didn't 








percentage of question-requirement types receiving orientation 
response components, Experiment I
Mean Square DF F-Value
55.13 1 <1.00
210.74 14
Question-requirement 105.13 1 <1.00
Q-requirement X Age 161.99 1 1.25































Discourse X Age 
Error (b)
Gesture 



























Gesture X Discourse .07 














Discourse X Age 
Error (b)
Gesture 
Gesture X Age 
Error (c)
Gesture X Discourse 






















* F- values were evaluated for significance using the conservative
criterion of reducing the degrees of freedom on the repeated measures
variables to 1. The nonconservative IT .05(2,28) = 3.34.
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TABLE 21




































* F-values were evaluated for significance using the conservative
criterion of reducing the degrees of freedom on the repeated measures 
variable to 1. The nonconservative F .05(2,28) = 3.34.
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TABLE 22
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ANOVA for number of simple acting responses, 
Experiment I





1 < 1.00  
14
Discourse 
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ANOVA for number of reference responses, 
Experiment I
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ANOVA for number of conflated responses, Experiment I
































Gesture X Discourse 












ANOVA for number of simple informing responses,
Experiment I
































Gesture X Discourse 












* F-values were evaluated for significance by conservative criterion of
reducing degrees of freedom on repeated measures to 1. The noncon­
servative F .05(2,28) = 3.34.
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TABLE 27




































Gesture X Discourse 2.47









*F-values were evaluated for significance by the conservative criterion
of reducing the degrees of freedom on repeated measures variables to 1.
The nonconversative 1? .05(2,28) = 3.34.
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TABLE 28
ANOVA for number of responses that
Experiment I
Source Mean Square DF
Age 10.01 1
Error (a) 5.89 14
Discourse .88 2
Discourse X Age .67 2
Error (b) 2.32 28
Gesture 27.10 1
Gesture X Age 7.59 1
Error (c) 1.13 14
Gesture X Discourse 1.50 2
Gesture X Disc. X Age .88 2












ANOVA for number or responses that contain informing,
Experiment I
Source Mean Square DF F-Value
Age
Error (a)



























Gesture X Discourse 2.01 2 <1.00
Gesture X Disc. X Age .95 2 <1.00
Error (d) 2.15 28
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TABLE 30
ANOVA for percentage of questions within circumstances of Experiments
given linguistically codable responses




















ANOVA for directionality in conflated responses,
Experiment I





















*fj-values were evaluated for significance by reducing the degrees of 
freedom on the repeated measures variables to 1.
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TABLE 32






Direction X Age 
Error (b)
















* _F-values were evaluated for significance by conservative criterion of 
reducing degrees of freedom on repeated measures to 1.
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